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ABSTRACT
The following study examines the NDP's relationship with 
labour. Historically, NDP labour relations have been tenuous 
at best. In the 1990s, however, this relationship has been 
seriously threatened. The aim of this study is to probe into 
how NDP- labour relations have functioned in the past, and how 
they might evolve in the future. The first chapter reviews 
CCF-NDP relations with labour from 1932 to 1988. This is 
followed by a literature review designed to provide the 
necessary background on NDP-labour relations. Chapter three 
looks at the nature of NDP-labour relations and their impact 
on the NDP's electoral fortunes in the 1993 federal election 
campaign. The fourth chapter examines how NDP-labour 
relations have evolved following the 1993 federal election.
As well, included in this chapter is an alternative 
structural model for the NDP designed to not only strengthen 
NDP-labour relations, but to also increase the party's 
electoral competitiveness. Finally, chapter five 
summarizes the study's main points and arguments.
i n
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NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS: CRISES AND CHALLENGES IN THE 1990S
INTRODUCTION
The electoral setback suffered by the NDP during the 1993 
federal election has forced the party to re-examine its 
relationship with organized labour. Labour, too, has felt 
compelled to re-evaluate its relationship with the NDP.
Most social democratic parties have close ties with labour. 
The central premise of this study, however, that a similar 
relationship in Canada has not been as strong; and in the 
1990s it is under attack. From a topical standpoint, this 
study identifies and analyzes the problems which have 
historically plagued NDP-labour relations.
The first chapter of this study looks at the 
evolutionary development of CCF-NDP relations with organized 
labour between 1932-1988. This chapter presents data on 
CCF-NDP electoral fortunes and reviews the financial and 
electoral support that labour has given to the party. It 
also includes data which lists the numbers of union locals 
affiliated to the NDP as well as the rules outlining union 
affiliation.
The second chapter is a review of the literature from 
1988 to 1995. The literature reviewed comes from various 
books, newspapers, labour discussion papers, and NDP renewal 
conference material. In addition to revealing material 
regarding NDP-labour relations, this chapter includes 
material which probes into such topics as party leadership,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the NDP in Quebec, party structure, and how New Democrats 
define themselves and their rcle within the NDP. In 
addition to exposing the relevant issues which have shaped 
the nature of NDP-labour relations, this chapter also looks 
at the issues which have caused intra-party conflict and 
NDP-labour strife.
Chapter three examines NDP-labour relations during the 
1993 federal election campaign. Specifically, it looks at 
the reasons responsible for NDP-labour tensions during the 
federal election campaign. As an important background, this 
chapter includes a discussion of the various factors which 
have influenced voting behaviour in Canada. Additionally, 
it compares the political attitudes of union voters to union 
leaders to shed light on why so few trade unionists voted 
for the NDP in 1993.
The fourth chapter examines and evaluates, in detail, 
one of the root causes for NDP-labour tensions - the Ontario 
NDP government’s Social Contract Act (Bill 48). In 
addition, this chapter examines the records of provincial 
NDP governments which have governed in Canada during the 
1990s. Lastly, this chapter uses the transaction theory as 
an aid in producing an alternative structural model for the 
NDP. The transaction theory facilitates in the 
understanding of the factors which have influenced NDP- 
labour relations during the 1990s. Ralph Goldman contends 
that the main premise behind the transaction theory is that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"when persons contribute effort and action to an organized 
group, they are giving something in the expectation of 
receiving something else..."(1) Not only do both parties 
have to profit from an exchange, a high degree of trust 
towards each other is also required in order to carry out a 
successful transaction.
The political transactions which occur between parties, 
called currencies, are divided into three categories:
Shares (decisional elements); incumbencies (positional 
elements); and commodities (materiel exchanges). Decisional 
elements refer to an individual’s influence within the 
decision making process of an organization.(2) Positional 
elements describe when individuals contribute to a group 
with the expectation of personal reward in return, for 
instance, job patronage as a reward for party service.(3) 
Finally, materiel exchanges describe the exchange of 
materials, most notably money, as an instrument for 
achieving an individual's goals.(4)
It will be argued that by implementing structural 
changes the NDP can create a party in which the channels of 
communication between it and labour are enhanced. As a 
result, trust will be restored, both parties will profit 
from exchanges, and successful transactions will take place. 
By creating an environment which encourages transactions to 
occur, cooperation between the NDP and labour will be 
expanded, conflict reduced, and political integration
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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enhanced. Therefore, the transaction theory can help to 
explain why NDP-labour relations have been tenuous and 
controversial in the past and how they can be improved upon, 
through structural changes, in the future.
The fifth, and final, chapter includes a brief review 
of all key concepts and issues as they pertain to NDP-labour 
relations. This chapter will also reiterate the main 
arguments of the study.
The following chapters will clearly show why NDP-labour 
strife is detrimental to the interests of both 
organizations. In order to survive as a credible political 
entity, the NDP must have labour’s endorsement, its foot 
soldiers, and its financial contributions. Furthermore, the 
labour movement, particularly those unions most unhappy with 
the NDP (the Canadian Auto Workers and most public sector 
unions), should not abandon the party or divert their 
resources to extra-parliamentary social coalitions. To 
follow such an approach would only lesson labour’s 
effectiveness to influence public policy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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6
CCF-NDP RELATIONS WITH LABOUR: 1932-1988
CHAPTER ONE
This chapter will examine CCF-NDP relations with 
organized labour from 1932 to 1988. It will be argued that 
the party's leadership saw trade union support, specifically 
in Ontario, as necessary to expand beyond its western base 
of support. However, the voting behaviour of union members 
is only one of many factors which must be considered. The 
number of local unions affiliated to the NDP and labour's 
financial contributions to the party are also important.
Historically, less than encouraging results at the 
ballot box have been interpreted a number of different ways. 
Positions in the trade unions and the party range from 
severing ties at one extreme, to strengthening ties at the 
other. The controversy surrounding this debate has 
persisted within the union movement and the party since the 
1930s. By contrast, most social democratic parties in 
other countries have enjoyed stronger and more harmonious 
relations with their labour allies. What, then, are the 
factors which make social democracy unique in Canada? To 
answer this question, this chapter will include comparisons 
between the CCF-NDP and the British Labour party.
The trade union movement in Canada must also be 
examined carefully. Trade unionists have long held 
differing views with regard to their role in politics. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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organizational structure of the trade union movement will 
also be reviewed. This is necessary because it will further 
illustrate that organized labour is not a monolithic entity. 
According to Freeman and Medoff: "Trade Unions are the
principal institutions of workers in modern capitalist 
societies."(1) Although this definition is accepted, it 
will be clearly shown that these institutions differ 
substantially from one another. Specifically, divisions 
between industrial and craft unions during the thirties and 
forties, and tensions between national and international 
unions during the sixties and seventies will be discussed- 
It is these differences within the labour movement that have 
shaped labour's sometimes controversial relationship with 
the CCF and its successor, the NDP.
To discuss these issues in a clear and concise manner, 
this chapter will be divided into three parts. Part one 
will focus on organized labour's relationship with the party 
from 1932 to 1945. Moreover, it is here where social 
democracy will be defined and how it has been able to find 
its place in Canadian politics. This is also a period where 
the CCF leadership attempted to obtain labour's support in 
Central Canada. As for the trade union movement in Canada, 
historically it has been seriously divided on the issue of 
direct political action. These divisions will be uncovered 
and analyzed. This chapter will also explain why the 1943 
endorsement of the CCF by the Canadian Congress of Labour
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(CCL) as the "political arm of labour,"(2) failed to result 
in electoral gains for the party in Canada's industrial 
heartland. Finally, the influence of the Communist party 
within the trade union movement and its impact during the
1945 federal election will be discussed.
Part two of this chapter will cover the period from
1946 to 1962. Emphasis will be placed on the CCF's gradual 
shift away from socialism, as described in the Regina 
Manifesto, towards the more politically moderate Winnipeg 
Declaration of Principles in 1956- It will be argued that 
through moderation the CCF hoped to gain greater union 
support. As well, during this period significant changes 
within the trade union movement directly influenced party- 
labour relations. The merger between the Trades and Labour 
Congress (TLC) and the CCL helped unify labour's voice in 
Canada. Furthermore, the growing numbers of unionized 
workers during this period led to a more confident and 
politically active labour movement. It is these changes, 
both within the party and the labour movement, which made it 
possible for the founding of the New Democratic party in 
1961.
Finally, Part three will review the NDP's relationship 
with labour from 1963 to 1988. This section will include 
statistical information on NDP electoral fortunes, with 
particular attention given to the voting behaviour of trade 
unionists. Moreover, the question of whether or not the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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transformation of the CCF into the NDP has benefitted the 
party will be discussed. This section ends at 1988 because 
it was during this period when serious cracks first appeared 
between labour and the party over electoral strategy. Many 
prominent trade unionists criticized the NDP for not 
focussing on the Free Trade debate. Additionally, it will 
be shown that during this period formal ties between the NDP 
and labour, by way of affiliation, have made up only a small 
percentage of Canada's total union membership. Furthermore, 
these trade unionists have not been shown to favour the NDP 
over the Liberals or Conservatives during election time.
Part 1.
Social Democracy in Canada
In 1932 the decision to create the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was taken. The following year 
at its first National Convention, the CCF adopted the Regina 
Manifesto, which outlined the party's principles and 
objectives. The Regina Manifesto was intended to offer 
Canadians something radically different from what the two 
traditional parties had been offering. The founders of the 
CCF believed that the Depression demonstrated that 
capitalism had failed. They proposed "The establishment of 
a planned, socialized economic order, in order to make 
possible the most efficient development of the natural 
resources and the most equitable distribution of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
national income."(3). The membership of the CCF consisted 
of various farmer, labour and socialist groups. These 
groups were united in their belief that changes were 
necessary to reverse the human misery caused by the 
Depression.
When compared to social democratic parties in other 
English-speaking countries, the CCF was certainly unique.
Its Manifesto was far more radical than the British Labour 
Party's. For example, the final paragraph of the Regina 
Manifesto states: "No CCF Government will rest content 
until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation 
the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to 
the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative 
Commonwealth."(4) By contrast, the British Labour party did 
not fully support socialism nor did it recognize the class 
struggle as the motor of social change.(5) Referring to the 
British labour movement, Henry Pelling contends that "...the 
comparative prosperity of the employed workers in the late 
nineteenth century limited the success of the Socialists' 
appeal."(6) Moreover, as the name would suggest, the 
British Labour Party (BLP) was heavily influenced by the 
British trade unions. It was labourism that had influenced 
the creation of the BLP. Labourism, unlike socialism, was 
concerned with the improvement of life for the working class 
rather than replacing capitalism with socialism.(7)
There are two reasons why social democracy evolved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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differently in Canada than in Great Britain. First, Canada 
during the 1930s, was mainly a rural and agrarian country. 
Less than 15 percent of the country’s urban workforce was 
unionized.(8) Therefore, the creation of a major national 
labour party in Canada was not a realistic objective.
Second, the trade union movement was fragmented and, for the 
most part, uninterested in involving itself with politics. 
For example, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC), 
the largest union organization in the country during the 
1930s, followed in the traditions of the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL), choosing to remain "...independent of any 
political organization"(9) Thus, a lack of political 
interest within the labour movement, combined with a small 
unionized workforce, differentiated Canadian social 
democracy from that of Great Britain.
At first, the mainly rural roots of the CCF rendered it 
irrelevant in Canada's industrial heartland- Participating 
in its first federal election in 1935, the CCF won only 
seven seats.(10) Moreover, the party failed to win a single 
seat east of Manitoba. In fact, the CCF ran no candidates 
in the Maritimes and obtained only eight percent of the 
popular vote in Ontario and less than one percent of the 
popular vote in Quebec.(11) The CCF leadership realized 
that more had to be done in order to obtain trade union 
support. The major problem facing the CCF was that there 
were no formal rules for trade unions to affiliate with the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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party. The CCF's leadership understood that the party was a 
coalition of various interests. If rules for union 
affiliation were established, then it was important that 
they not allow labour to gain a dominant position within the 
party. The CCF was forced to deal with this issue when on 
August 15th, 1938 District 26 of the United Mine workers 
(UMW) voted to affiliate with the party.(12) To prevent the 
possibility of eventual union domination, the party allowed 
affiliation to occur only at the local union level. As 
well, the rules outlining union representation were 
designed to severely limit labour's voice within the party. 
Instead of following the practices of the British Labour 
party which allowed block voting and block representation, 
the CCF formulated a system that gave unions less 
representation per capita than their constituency 
organizations.(13) As a result, union representation within 
the CCF and its successor, the NDP, was always limited 
whereas within the BLP trade union membership was 
dominant.(14) Thus, union support was desired by the CCF. 
However, union control was not.
The Labour Movement in Canada: 1932-1940
Formal ties by way of affiliation between labour and 
the CCF were, for the most part, non-existent during this 
period. There was very little incentive to affiliate with 
the CCF. The party appeared a long way from becoming a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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significant political force in Canada, why, then, would a 
trade union local want to support and financially contribute 
to a party that had little chance of being elected? By 
affiliating with the CCF some trade unionists feared that 
their ability to lobby the traditional parties would be 
damaged. Therefore, many union leaders believed that 
affiliation would hinder labour's interests rather than 
advance them. To better understand this issue it is 
necessary to review the developments occurring within the 
trade union movement during this period.
In Canada there were two opposing philosophies that 
emerged within the labour movement during the 1930s.(15)
The first paralleled closely with the politically active 
role that trade unions played in Britain. This perspective 
was imported to Canada by British immigrants. These 
immigrants were able to influence the trade union movement 
in Canada because they were not considered as foreigners in 
English-speaking Canada. According to Gad Horowitz, their 
political views were accepted because English Canada's 
political culture already contained non-liberal elements, 
such as toryism, within it.(16) The second view to emerge 
was modelled after the American example which followed the 
Gomperist approach of political non-alignment. Samuel 
Gompers, a prominent American labour leader, believed that 
labour should not support certain political parties over 
others. Rather, he believed that labour should support only
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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those individual politicians who would advance labour's 
wishes. While the smaller All-Canadian Congress of Labour 
(ACCL) followed the former philosophy, the TLC favoured the 
latter.
Complicating matters for the CCF was the fact that the 
two organizations were bitter rivals. The ACCL, after all, 
was established by a number of unions that were expelled 
from the TLC. The animosity between the two groups was 
public and well understood by the leaders of the CCF. The 
CCF, therefore, attempted to cautiously build a relationship 
with the ACCL without isolating the much larger TLC.
The second, and more serious, problem facing the CCF 
came from the Communist Party. Although the CCF's 
constitution prohibited the admission of individuals 
belonging to another party, it feared Communist infiltration 
through trade union affiliation. This concern was well 
founded. Since the 1920s the Communists were actively 
organizing workers. Communist Party members created the 
Workers Unity League (WUL) which brought an estimated 25,000 
unorganized workers into industrial unions by 1935.(17) By 
organizing workers, the Communists attempted to gain a 
prominent voice within the Canadian trade union movement.
To successfully achieve this objective, WUL activists, on 
instructions from the Communist party, began merging their 
unions into the AFL.(18)
The CCF, and its sympathizers within the labour
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movement, were also organizing workers. Not surprisingly, 
the Communists and the CCF soon became intense rivals, as 
both political organizations claimed to be the party best 
suited to represent labour's interests. In the United 
States, the AFL grew increasingly concerned over the growth 
and political orientation of these newer industrial unions. 
After suspending them for one year, the AFL expelled these 
organizations entirely in 1937.(19) The expelled unions 
then created their own organization independent from the AFL 
called the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The 
rift between the AFL and some of its industrial unions soon 
spilled over into Canada. Following their decision in the 
United States, the AFL successfully pressured their Canadian 
affiliate, the TLC, to expel all CIO unions from its 
organization as well.
By the beginning of 1940, the CIO unions and the ACCL 
began holding meetings over the possibility of a merger 
between the two organizations. From these meetings came an 
eventual agreement to create the Canadian Congress of Labour 
(CCL). The new Congress elected a prominent Canadian labour 
union leader, Aaron Mosher, as its first president.(20) The 
election of Mosher as president of the CCL was expected to 
have a positive impact on CCF-Labour relations. In 1932, 
Mosher attended the Calgary Conference as the president of 
the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees. It was here 
where Mosher, along with various other farmer, labour and
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socialist groups announced the founding of the CCF. Thus, 
there was no secret where the loyalties of the CCL's 
president lay. However, since only union locals, rather 
than federations or councils could affiliate with the CCF, 
Mosher's role, and the impact of other CCF members within 
the CCL executive, was limited. In other words, the CCL did 
not have the authority to command its members to affiliate 
with the CCF. Additionally, many of the former CIO unions 
were Communist led or influenced. These unions were not 
only unsympathetic towards the CCF, they were also the 
party’s most serious political competitors.
Clearly, then, during the latter half of the 1930s 
there were major changes occurring within the trade union 
movement. First, there was the growth of industrial unions, 
which were beginning to rival the size and strength of the 
older craft unions. Second, Communist influence and 
involvement within these newer unions posed a direct 
challenge to the CCF in their drive to secure labour’s 
support. Finally, despite the efforts made by the CCF to 
gain trade union support, only one union, UMW District 26, 
affiliated with the CCF by 1940.
The party's failure to attract trade union support was 
reflected in the 1940 federal election results when it won 
only eight seats. More serious was the party's showing in 
Ontario. Not only did the CCF fail to win a seat in 
Ontario, but it also saw its support slide to 3.8 percent
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of the vote, down significantly from the 8 percent showing 
that it received during the 1935 federal election.(21) 
Although the CCF's failure to obtain labour's support was 
not the only factor responsible for its weak showing, the 
party's leadership nevertheless realized that substantial 
policy changes were needed to obtain trade union support.
CCF-Labour Relations: 1940-1945
CCF-Labour relations would change dramatically during 
the war years. Unlike the Depression years of the 1930s 
when many labour unions were weak and timid, full employment 
as a result of the war increased the size and the strength 
of the industrial unions. The CCF also benefited from the 
war because their message for a larger governmental role in 
the economy was not considered as radical during the war 
years as it was during the 1930s. The Liberals, after all, 
had been intervening and regulating the economy to fulfil 
Canada's obligations for the war effort. It appeared the 
CCF's leadership, sensing the opportunity for making serious 
political gains had materialized, began to modify its 
message in order to attract the growing middle class and the 
trade unions.
The CCF's steady rise in the polls produced immediate 
benefits for the party. Now that the party was considered a 
political contender, labour appeared to be moving closer to 
it. Interestingly, the CCL's endorsement of the CCF in
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September 1943 occurred at about the same time that a Gallup 
Poll placed the CCF ahead of both the Liberals and the 
Conservatives. Increasing popularity combined with the 
CCL's endorsement led to a substantial rise in the number of 
unions which chose to affiliate with the CCF. By 1944 the 
CCF had 100 union locals with approximately 50,000 members 
affiliated to the party.(22) However, the party's rules 
outlining union affiliation prevented labour from obtaining 
a dominant position within the CCF. During the 1944 
national convention only 19 out of 208 delegates were from 
affiliated union locals.(23)
At the CCF's 1944 national convention it soon became 
clear that the party was not as eager to follow the 
socialist dogma which dominated the pages of the Regina 
Manifesto. The CCF’s national secretary, David Lewis, was 
instrumental in steering the party away from its socialist 
roots. Not all CCFers, however, were happy with the 
proposed changes. On November 30, 1944 the Windsor Star 
reported: "Manifesto Changes Stir Hot Dispute Between
Factions at Convention." The debate was centred around the 
statement within section six of the 1944 Manifesto regarding 
the issue of social ownership which read: "The
socialization and democratic control, under either public or 
co-operative ownership, of key industries which are 
monopolistic in operation..."(24) By this statement the 
party appeared to be abandoning its commitment to
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"eradicate” capitalism. The Manifesto went even further by 
stating: "The socialization of large-scale enterprise,
however, does not mean taking over every private 
business."(25) Obviously, replacing capitalism with 
socialism was no longer a stated CCF objective.
While the 1944 Manifesto was threatening to divide the 
CCF, the CCL supported the more moderate position being 
conveyed by the party. Labour, for the most part, had 
always tended to be "more conservative" than the CCF, and 
consequently the party's changes bridged some of the 
ideological differences which existed between the two 
organizations.(26) The majority of Canada's trade unions 
were not opposed to capitalism as it had existed during this 
period. The party's overtures to labour, however, did not 
translate into overwhelming electoral support. The 
governing Liberals, led by Mackenzie King, took a number of 
CCF ideas and used them as their own. In 1940, the Liberals 
passed the Unemployment Insurance Act, and in 1944 they 
made a key concession to labour when they established by 
Order-in-Council compulsory bargaining rights.(27) The 
major advantage that the Liberals had over the CCF was that 
they were the governing party. In this position the 
Liberals had the power to demonstrate, with legislative 
action, their promises whereas the CCF could not. When in 
1945 the Liberals called an election many Canadians, 
including trade unionists, saw no need to take a chance with
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an inexperienced group of CCFers when the more experienced 
Liberals appeared equally committed to implementing many of 
the same programs.
In addition to the Liberal party, the CCF had the 
Communist challenge to contend with. As mentioned, there 
■were many Communist-led unions within the CCL. Their 
opposition to the CCF disrupted the possible development of 
closer ties between the two organizations. As early as 
1940, the Communists attempted to seize control of the CCL 
executive when at its first national convention Nigel 
Morgan, the Communist regional director of the CIO in 
Vancouver, ran against Aaron Mosher for the presidency. 
Although Mosher did win the election with 283 votes, Morgan 
still managed to receive the support of 175 delegates.(28) 
Morgan’s defeat, however, did not diminish the Communist 
presence or influence within the CCL. In the following 
years, the Communists successfully attacked the credibility 
of the CCL's newly created Political Action Committees 
(PAC). The PACs were set up to persuade the rank and file 
to vote for the CCF. The impact of Communist opposition 
towards the PACs ultimately hindered their role 
substantially. Consequently, and unfortunately for the CCF, 
overt Communist opposition toward the PACs contributed to 
the party's disappointing electoral performance in 1945.
The Communists went even further in challenging the 
CCF. Not only were they opposing closer ties between the
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CCL and the CCF, they founded a new party called the Labor- 
Progressive party (LPP) in 1943. The LPP was created to 
offer trade unionists a political alternative to the CCF.
The LPP supported class collaboration, it asked unions to 
support a no strike pledge, and it promised to support the 
Liberal government.(29) The LPP's stance was based on the 
belief that the federal government should be aided in its 
war effort to defeat fascism. It was the fascist states, 
after all, which posed the greatest threat to Communism with 
the German invasion of the Soviet Union. For this reason, 
the Communist International favoured class collaboration in 
order to help defeat the Axis powers. The Liberals, for the 
most part, recognized that there were political advantages 
associated by allying themselves with the Communists in 
certain regions. For example, in cities such as Windsor, 
the Liberal-LPP alliance was desirable because the city’s 
largest union, the United Auto Workers, was sympathetic to 
the Communists.(30) Consequently, during the 1945 election 
campaign, the Liberals agreed to allow candidates endorsed 
by the LPP to run under the Liberal-Labour banner in 
Windsor.
Thus, as the 1945 federal election campaign was coming 
to an end, the CCF could not obtain the overwhelming support 
that it needed from the labour movement. Although the CCL 
endorsed the CCF as the political arm of labour, few unions 
ever did affiliate with the party. Furthermore, the
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Liberals had skilfully managed to gain the support of most 
of the TLC and CCL unions shortly before the election.(31)
The Liberals were ultimately successful because they made a 
series of key legislative concessions to organized labour. 
Moreover, the party's main rival from the left, the 
Communists, had managed to frustrate the development of 
closer ties between the CCF and the CCL. During the 
election campaign the Communists challenged the CCF in many 
electoral ridings. Not surprisingly, the CCF failed to make 
the impact its leaders had expected during the initial weeks 
of the election campaign. The final electoral results on 
June 11, 1945, revealed that the Liberals had won 125 seats, 
the Conservatives 67 seats, and the CCF 28 seats.(32) As 
well, the CCF which had once led in the opinion polls in 
1943, received only 15.6 percent of the popular vote in 
1945. (33)
Part 2.
The Transition From CCF to NDP: 1946-1962
In many ways, the dramatic changes occurring within 
Canadian society contributed to the transition of the CCF 
into the NDP. The end of the Second World War did not lead 
to a return of the economic conditions of the 1930s, as the 
CCF had warned. Realizing this, the party was forced to 
adjust to the economic realities of post-war Canadian 
society. Although many CCFers were divided over how to make
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their party more attractive, one view eventually prevailed. 
The party bureaucrats believed that a move towards the 
political centre would make it more attractive to the 
growing numbers of people who made up the middle-class. As
well, the labour movement was also undergoing dramatic
changes. The advent of the Cold War led to a major purge of 
the Communists within the trade unions. Additionally, the 
labour movement emerged after the war larger and with
expectations to expand its membership in the new industrial
economy. As a result of these changes, the CCF hoped to 
establish closer links with organized labour as a way to 
improve its electoral fortunes.
In a report outlining the CCF's role in Parliament 
during the 1946 session, it is clear that the party wanted 
to demonstrate its value to labour. Not surprisingly, 
missing in this document were any reference to the socialist 
dogma that dominated CCF material in the past. The party's 
position on labour issues were discussed in the following 
manner:
The 1946 session, like all previous sessions, 
showed clearly that labour has no voice in
Parliament other than its Party, the CCF In
addition to fighting the immediate struggle of 
labour, the CCF members continued to demand 
a national labour code to ensure genuine 
collective bargaining, union security, higher 
wage levels and improved working conditions.(34)
Thus, despite the CCF's failure to receive a significant
level of union support during the 1945 election, it was
still prepared to convey a pro-labour image- By the late
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1940s many of the obstacles hindering the development of 
closer ties between the CCF and labour were being removed.
The Communists, who had been such formidable foes of the 
CCF, were now being removed from the unions. Fortunately 
for the CCF, the Communists had the ill-fortune of being 
associated with the foreign policies of the Soviet 
Union.(35) As a result, the CCF was able to fill the void 
left by the Communists and therefore increase its influence 
within the CCL.
The continuation of economic prosperity, however, 
continued to have a negative impact on the electoral 
fortunes of the CCF. During the 1949 federal election the 
party won only 13 seats, a decline of 15 seats from 
1945.(36) Although winning 23 seats in 1953, the CCF's 
share of the popular continued to decline. In 1953 the 
party won 11.3 percent of the popular vote, which was a drop 
2.1 percent from 1949.(37) The electoral setbacks suffered 
by the CCF signalled to the party's leadership that major 
changes were needed.
The party's national executive drafted and presented to 
the 1956 convention the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles. 
Unlike other CCF documents, such as the 1944 Election 
Manifesto, the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles was 
significant because it was intended to replace the 
objectives and principles outlined in the Regina Manifesto. 
The differences between the two documents were remarkable.
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Whereas the Regina Manifesto asserted that "No CCF 
Government will rest until it has eradicated capitalism...'* 
the final paragraph of the Winnipeg Declaration stated the 
following:
The CCF will not rest content until every 
person in this land and in all other lands 
is able to enjoy equality and freedom, a 
sense of human dignity, and an opportunity 
to live a rich and meaningful life as a 
citizen of a free and peaceful world.(38)
Apparently, then, the CCF accepted the notion that
capitalism could be reformed rather than replaced by
socialism. In a style which closely resembled that of the
two traditional parties, the Winnipeg Declaration was an
ambiguous document. Moreover, it contained little
ideological content when compared to its predecessor, the
Regina Manifesto.
The Unionism of the 1950s
The CCF’s move toward the political centre paralleled 
closely a series of changes occurring within the labour 
movement. Labour appeared increasingly satisfied with the 
state. It had won collective bargaining rights, and as the 
economy continued to grow so, too, did union membership.
From 1945 to 1955 the number of Canadians belonging to trade 
unions rose from 15.7 per cent to 23.6 per cent of the 
country’s workforce.(39) Having won most of the rights it 
had fought for during the war years, the labour movement 
became increasingly complacent. Nowhere was this more
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evident than in the CCL. It was the CCL, after all, that 
had been the most vocal advocate of union rights during the 
war years. The prosperity attained during the post-war era 
meant that the CCL was satisfied by simply lobbying the 
Liberals or Conservatives for further concessions. The fact 
that this strategy following the traditional methods used by 
the TLC narrowed the differences between these two union 
organizations.
In addition, the removal of the Communists also paved 
the way towards organizational unity between the TLC and the 
CCL. Particularly in the CCL, the Communists had wielded 
tremendous influence both within its organization and 
amongst its union affiliates. As late as 1946, for example, 
ten of the CCL's twenty-three unions, representing 
approximately one-third of the organization's membership, 
were either Communist-led or influenced.(40) The advent of 
the Cold War led to the expulsion of the Communists from the 
CCL. Soon thereafter the CCL and the TLC approached one 
another to discuss the possibility of a merger.
In December 1953, a Unity Committee consisting of 
representatives from the TLC and the CCL was 
established.(41) In 1956, after two years of joint 
discussions, the TLC and the CCL merged to form the Canadian 
Labour Congress (CLC). This new union organization united 
approximately three-quarters of Canada's labour 
movement.(42) More importantly for the CCF, the executive
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council of the CLC contained a number of CCFers. Thus, it 
was to no surprise that the CCF, equipped with a more 
moderate political platform, and the CLC, more receptive to 
the party’s more moderate stance, established a joint 
political committee in 1958. Eventually this committee 
became known as the National Committee for the New Party. 
Thus, the seeds were planted for the creation of a new 
political party in Canada.
The Founding of the New Democratic Party
Not all CCFers were keen on the idea of forming a new
political party with closer links to organized labour- As
early as 1945 many within the party saw labour as a
hinderance to the movement rather than a valuable ally.
Although the party bureaucrats, led by Lewis, were able to
move the CCF towards the political centre, the left-wing of
the party continued to voice its misgivings. For example,
Carlyle King, the President of the Saskatchewan CCF, was
quoted for saying in the Canadian' Forum the following:
The trouble is that socialist parties 
have gone a-whoring after the Bitch 
Goddess. They have wanted Success,
Victory, Power; forgetting that the 
main business of socialist parties is 
not to form governments but to change 
minds. When people begin to concentrate 
on success at the polls, they become 
careful and cautious; and when they 
become careful and cautious, the virtue 
goes out of them.(43)
King’s assessment is interesting because he criticizes the
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party for becoming too preoccupied with seeking to improve 
its electoral fortunes. If this was truly the objective of 
the party's leaders, then they failed miserably during the 
1950s.
As mentioned, the CCF won 28 seats during the 1945 
federal election campaign. Despite closer CCF-labour 
relations during the 1950s, the party failed to make 
significant gains at the ballot box. Certainly, changes in 
the CCF's platform, and closer ties with labour, are not the 
sole factors for the party's declining electoral fortunes. 
However, during this period, the CCF did begin to experience 
an erosion of its traditional base of support in mainly 
rural Saskatchewan. In that province the party saw its 
number of federal seats decline from 18 in 1945 to a mere 5 
in 1949.(44) Although making a slight comeback during the 
1953 and 1957 federal elections, by the 1958 campaign the 
party had only one seat remaining in Saskatchewan.
Similarly, the CCF's share of the popular also fell 
dramatically. In 1949, for instance, the CCF had 44.4 
percent of the popular vote in Saskatchewan.(45) In 1958, 
though, the CCF's share of the popular vote in Saskatchewan 
had fallen to 28.4 percent.(46) Unfortunately for the CCF, 
while it lost a significant portion of the farm vote, it 
failed to make strong electoral gains at the federal level 
in the provinces with sizable unionized populations, such as 
Ontario and British Columbia.
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With the CCF reduced to only 8 seats during the 1958 
federal election, the party's leadership began working on 
yet another political strategy. For the party's leaders 
this meant moulding the CCF in a manner that would make it 
attractive to the growing numbers of middle-class Canadians 
and trade unionists. After two years of ongoing discussions 
with the CLC, the CCF endorsed the creation of the New Party 
at its 1960 convention.(47) Some party members, however, 
argued that the CCF would become dominated by trade 
unionists and consequently these newer members would move 
the CCF further towards the political centre. Indeed, 
reformism was far more attractive to most union leaders 
within the CLC than socialism.(48) Fears of union 
domination appeared very real because of the comments being 
made by many prominent CCFers. For instance, Stanley 
Knowles stated the following in 1961: "...one of the main
reasons the New Party is coming into being is because labour 
wishes a more effective means...for making its contribution 
to the political life of this nation."(49) The CCF was 
eager to establish such a relationship with labour because 
it was expected to provide the party with much needed 
financial support and long-term electoral success. As well, 
the party's leadership felt that labour represented the 
working class and therefore was the natural ally of a left- 
of-centre party.
The transition from CCF to NDP was not an entirely
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smooth one. Walter Pitman, for example, won a federal seat 
while running as a New Party candidate during a 1960 by- 
election. Although Pitman's election was prior to the NDP's 
founding convention, scheduled for August 1961, the CCF's 
parliamentary caucus seriously considered not recognizing 
Pitman as a caucus member.(50) The house leader of the CCF, 
Hazen Argue from Saskatchewan, along with many of the 
party's caucus members were not supportive of the New Party 
proposal. Argue challenged the party bureaucrats by first 
running against their choice for leader, Tommy Douglas, and 
then by publicly saying that he would quit the NDP because 
"a clique of Trade unionists"(51) had captured the party.
Thus, there were concerns over organized labour's 
influence in the NDP. Ultimately, however, these concerns 
were alleviated because there were few structural 
differences between the CCF and the NDP. The rules 
outlining union representation continued to guarantee the 
supremacy of the constituency association over local union 
affiliates. Additionally, there was not an overwhelming 
number of union locals which chose to affiliate with the NDP 
soon after it was founded. Although the CLC was 
enthusiastic over the creation of the new party, it had no 
authority to require its unions to affiliate with the NDP, 
and most chose not to.
Although the founding of the NDP in August 1961 did not 
lead to a significant number of local unions deciding to
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Affiliation fees were not the major source of union 
contributions, nor did they represent a significant portion 
of the party's overall budget. The party's leadership, in 
fact, sought closer ties with labour because they thought it 
would translate into rank and file union support for the 
party during election time. Although many trade unionists 
did become avid party members and valuable volunteers during 
election time, the NDP failed to be the party of choice 
amongst trade unionists.
In 1962, the NDP participated in its first federal 
election. In many ways, the 1962 election results were 
neither overwhelmingly positive nor were they negative. On 
the one hand, the NDP did succeed in winning a record number 
10 seats in British Columbia and 6 seats in Ontario. Many 
NDPers attributed these gains to labour's financial 
contributions and organizational expertise. On the other 
hand, the NDP won only 19 seats which was far less than 
expected. Interestingly, for the first time the party 
failed to win a single seat in Saskatchewan. For many 
within the party's left wing, the 1962 election was proof 
that moving away from its rural roots would do nothing to 
improve the party’s electoral fortunes. Thus, the 1962 
federal election failed to resolve the internal debate 
raging within the NDP over party policy and its 
relationship with organized labour.
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Although the debate surrounding party-labour relations 
remained unresolved, statistical evidence shows that trade 
unionists did not rally behind the NDP during the 1962 
federal election (Table 1.1).
TABLE 1.1
Trade Union Voting, Federal Election, 1962.
= = Union Families E Non-Union
I = E Families
1 Conservative E 26% = 40%
= Liberal = 3 8  = 3 8
I NDP = 22 = 8
Source: Gad Horowitz ,= Canadian. Labour in Poli tics, 1968,p41. 
®ie data indicates th^t the NDP received fevSer union votes 
•Qian either the ConseiS/atives or the Liberals. Certainly, 
■Qien, while the leadership of the CLC was prepared to 
^ldorse the NDP, rank and file union members were not as 
eager to follow their ̂ Leaders advice. =
E Unfortunately for the NDP, the inability of labour 
Readers to influence t3ie voting behaviour of their members 
prevented the party faarn making substantial |electoral gains 
Si 1962. Additionally, many of the NDP's traditional 
Supporters did not agree with the party’s sKift toward the
“  Z 3
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political centre- Now perceived by many as labour's party, 
the NDP lost further support from those people who had a 
negative image of the labour movement- Ultimately, these 
issues would continue to dominate the nature and scope of 
NDP-labour relations throughout the following decades.
Part 3.
NDP-Labour Relations: 1963-1988
From 1963 to 1988, the NDP found itself incapable of 
moving beyond the status of a minor party for several 
reasons. The change from CCF to NDP did not lead to large- 
scale union affiliation to the party. More seriously, 
however, the NDP failed to obtain significant support from 
rank and file trade unionists during election time. As 
stated earlier, many of the party's critics believed that 
the lack of electoral success was attributed to the party's 
shift towards the political centre. By the late 1960s, a 
significant number of NDP dissenters argued that the party 
should return to its socialist roots. Within the labour 
movement significant changes were also becoming evident. 
Labour found itself unprepared to deal with a series of 
economic crises which arose during the 1970s. As a result, 
conflict between international and national unions 
eventually changed the overall composition and policy 
direction of the CLC.
During the 1960s support for the NDP remained 
relatively unchanged. As discussed, the party had won 19
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seats in 1962 and although it made marginal gains in terms 
of popular vote, by the 1968 election it won only 22 seats. 
For many NDPers, who had been opposed to the party's more 
moderate platform, electoral mediocrity was proof that the 
experiment had failed. Eventually known as the Waffle 
movement, this group of disaffected party members proposed 
that the NDP return to its socialist roots. They argued 
that Canada's sovereignty was threatened by foreign 
investment and control. Additionally, Wafflers favoured 
more social ownership and democratic control over all 
institutions within society. They also insisted that the 
party's bureaucrats be more open to criticism from its 
members as well. By 1969 this group drafted the Waffle 
Manifesto, which was presented and later defeated at the 
party's national convention in Winnipeg.
It is not surprising that the Waffle movement 
ultimately failed. After all, the majority of NDP members 
and convention delegates had consistently supported the 
party's shift to the political centre. By contrast, the 
Waffle Manifesto mirrored the Regina Manifesto in many ways. 
The first paragraph of the Waffle Manifesto stated the 
following: "Our aim as democratic socialists is to build an
independent socialist Canada."(52) With respect to labour, 
the Waffle Manifesto argued that "It is now time to go 
beyond the welfare state."(53) The Manifesto's defeat in 
1969 did not weaken the Waffle movement and the movement's
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leader, Jim Laxer, would eventually challenge David Lewis 
for the party's leadership during its 1971 convention.
The party's selection of David Lewis as their leader 
was significant in determining future relations between the 
NDP and organized labour. David Lewis had been actively 
seeking labour's support for the party since the late 1930s. 
He had also been instrumental during negotiations with CLC 
leaders to create the NDP in 1961- Now that Lewis was 
running for leadership of the NDP, it was clear which 
candidate labour was prepared to support. In fact, the 
overwhelming majority of labour delegates did support David 
Lewis over Jim Laxer in a what was a very close leadership 
race. If Laxer had won the leadership contest, the NDP 
would have certainly moved to the left and that would have 
had a negative impact on the party's relationship with the 
labour establishment. However, it is unclear, and almost 
impossible to assess, whether or not the NDP would have 
gained support from rank and file trade unionists had Laxer 
won the leadership of the NDP.
Within a year of becoming leader of the NDP, David 
Lewis led his party into an election. In 1972, the NDP won 
a party high of 31 seats. However, despite the increase in 
seats, the NDP's percentage of the popular vote of 17.7 
percent was not much higher than the party's 1968 showing 
when it received 17 percent support from the electorate.(54) 
In fact, the highest level of popular support received by
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the NDP was in 1988 when the party received 20.4 percent of 
the popular vote. Thus, on a nation-wide basis, support for 
the NDP during the 1970s-l9S0s remained relatively 
unchanged. Why did the party fail to make significant 
electoral gains? It appears that while union leaders 
supported the party, rank and file trade unionists continued 
to vote Liberal or Conservative. Moreover, since the NDP 
appeared stuck as a minor third party, many trade unionists 
often voted Liberal as a way of preventing the Conservatives 
from forming the government. During the 1974 federal 
election, for example, most trade unionists voted Liberal 
because the Conservatives had promised to introduce wage 
controls during the campaign.
Table 1.2












Liberal 42.2 41.8 40.4 (899)
Conservative 43.1 31.9 28.6 (817)
New Democrat 11.5 20.0 29.9 (336)
N (1221) (812) (110)
1984
Liberal 25.9 24.9 7.5 (742)
Conservative 60.2 53.5 53.7 (1697)
New Democrat 13.1 20.3 38.8 (485)
N (1761) (1122) (67)
Source: Keith Archer, Political Choices and Electoral
Consequences, 1990, pp. 62-63.
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Table 1.2 shows that among non-affiliated union members, the 
NDP finished third, behind both the conservatives and the 
Liberals during the 1979 and 1984 election campaigns. 
Interestingly in 1979 members of affiliated unions 
overwhelmingly supported the Liberals and only marginally 
favoured the NDP over the Conservatives. During the 1984 
federal election, the results indicate that members of 
affiliated unions supported the Conservatives far more than 
they did for the NDP. Clearly, then, the majority of trade 
unionists were not voting for the NDP. As well, even those 
members from affiliated union locals, to a lesser degree, 
supported either the Conservatives or the Liberals over the 
NDP.
Table 1.3
Unions Affiliated with the NDP and 
Membership of Affiliated Unions 
as a Percentage of 
















1961 278 71 1423 5.0
1962 612 186 1449 12.9
1963 689 218 1493 14.6
1964 683 216 1589 13.6
1969 764 256 2075 12.3
1974 754 283 2732 10.4
1979 745 295 3397 8.7
1984 730 267 3651 7.3
Source: NDP files, "Organizations affiliated with the NDP,"
selected years; Canada, Labour Canada, Directory of Labour 
Organizations in Canada, 1984.
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The transition from CCF to NDP also failed to lead to 
large-scale union affiliation with the party. Table 1.3 
indicates that shortly after the NDP was founded the number 
of union locals choosing to affiliate with the party more 
than doubled. However, by 1963, and only two years after 
the creation of the NDP, the affiliation process had peaked. 
Table 1.3 shows that the number of union members belonging 
to affiliated unions, as a percentage of Canada's total 
union membership, steadily declined from a high of 14.6 
percent in 1963 to a low of 7.3 percent by 1984. This 
decline is attributed to the number of new labour 
organizations, including public-sector unions, which grew 
rapidly during this period but were not interested in 
affiliating with the party. Therefore, formal links between 
the NDP and labour have never comprised a large percentage 
of Canada's total union membership.
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Table 1.4






















Source: Canada, Elections Canada, Registered Party Fiscal
Period Returns, selected years.
The $3ata in table 1.4 divides labour's financial 
contributions to the NDP into two categories and the years 
selected illustrate the difference between union totals in 
election years (1980,1984) and non-election years 
(1981,1985). Table 1.4 shows that union affiliation dues 
were small, yet steady, as a percentage of total federal 
party revenues. However, other union contributions 
fluctuated tremendously between election and non-election 
years. This is a significant point because it illustrates 
the importance of having labour as an ally during election 
time. Labour's financial contributions greatly enhanced its 
ability to influence the policy direction taken by the 
party. The party bureaucrats recognized that an NDP 
election platform had to conform with the interests of
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labour if it expected to receive much needed financial 
contributions. Moreover, this need for labour's financial 
support was only further exacerbated as election campaign 
costs escalated quickly during this period.
The Transformation of Labour in Canada
While the NDP struggled to improve its electoral 
fortunes, the labour movement in Canada experienced a number 
of profound changes. Rising inflation and unemployment 
rates combined with declining economic growth made labour 
far more militant during the 1970s than it had been during 
the economically prosperous 1960s. A rift within the 
international unions soon emerged when American union 
leaders eagerly supported protectionist government measures 
as a way to save jobs, even if it was at the expense of 
their Canadian members.(55) Unhappy with this stance, many 
of the Canadian affiliates broke their ties with these 
internationals to create the Council of Canadian Unions.
The majority, however, demanded, and eventually received, 
greater autonomy from the internationals while remaining 
within the CLC.
In addition to the emerging differences between 
national and international unions was the growth of public- 
sector unions. Public-sector union growth can be attributed 
to the expansion in the size of government at all three 
levels. The many social programs and services introduced
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during the 1960s and 1970s required thousands of new 
government employees to implement and administer. 
Representing the majority of these workers was the Canadian 
Union of Public Employees (CUPE). CUPE's growth had a 
significant impact on the future course of action taken by 
the CLC. Once dominated by private sector workers, the CLC 
was increasingly becoming influenced by public-sector 
workers. During the 1974 CLC convention it was CUPE which 
organized a reform group to question the role of the 
international unions. By 1975 CUPE became the largest union 
in Canada. Paralleling the growth of the public-sector 
unions was the decline in the number of international unions 
in Canada. Their share of organized workers fell from 71 
percent in 1965 to 51 percent in 1975.(56)
The tremendous rate of growth that was occurring 
amongst nationals led to tension between these unions and 
the internationals within the CLC. The internationals were 
vehemently opposed to the notions of Canadian nationalism 
and autonomy. Although the internationals were in a state 
of numerical decline, they still held the balance of power 
within the CLC. Consequently, the NDP was forced to back 
down from pursuing a more nationalistic agenda, which would 
have attracted the rank and file fearful that their jobs 
were threatened because of the growing threat of American 
protectionism. Robert Laxer points out that in 1975, the 
president of the CLC, Joe Morris, "...made it clear that
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continued financial and other backing of the CLC for the NDP 
would depend in the future on a continued rejection of 
nationalism as the answer to that threat of multinational 
corporations in Canada."(57) Not until the national unions 
were able to comprise a strong majority within the CLC did 
the organization alter its stance on this issue.
The CLC, however, did step up its political activity. 
When the Liberals imposed compulsory wage and price controls 
in 1975, the CLC successfully organized a "Day of Protest" 
the following year.(58) However, labour’s opposition, 
although impressive, did not convince the Liberals to 
reverse their decision. It soon became clear to many union 
leaders that only with closer ties to the NDP could labour's 
political objectives be realized. This growing sentiment 
was gradually reinforced during the late seventies and early 
eighties as national unions continued to grow. By 1986, 61 
percent of organized workers were in national unions and 
only 39 percent in international unions.(59)
Why, then, did the NDP fail to attract support from 
rank and file trade unionists during this period? The 
answer is that NDP-labour relations were shaped by way of 
discussions between prominent party members and union 
leaders. Labour's ties with the NDP were seldom determined 
by the workers themselves. Not surprisingly, union leaders 
invariably failed to influence the voting behaviour of their 
members. Additionally, the structure of the labour movement
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in Canada inhibited its ability to act as a unified body. 
Although the majority of labour unions were part of the CLC, 
that organization did not have the authority to dictate to 
its members how to act. For the NDP that meant that 
receiving an endorsement from the CLC did not necessarily 
mean that support from all of the Congress's members would 
follow. To further complicate matters, individual unions 
themselves were often divided along provincial or regional 
lines when deciding whether or not to support the NDP. 
Ultimately, labour’s sizeable financial contributions helped 
the NDP, but failure to obtain support from the rank and 
file prevented the party from seriously challenging the 
Liberals and Conservatives during this period.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented an historical review of the 
key events and issues that have shaped the NDP’s 
relationship with organized labour. Moreover, this chapter 
has clearly shown that this relationship has been tenuous at 
best. The CCF-NDP has never been a labour party. The 
rounding of the CCF was made possible only with the 
cooperation of various farmer, labour and socialist groups. 
Thus, labour was merely one component of a much larger 
coalition of interests united by their common belief that 
political change was necessary to reverse the economic 
misery caused by the Depression.
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During the 193 0s labour's support for the CCF was 
almost non-existent. The labour movement in Canada, 
traditionally weak and fragmented, was limited further by 
the Depression. With few financial resources, a small 
membership, and with the majority of its leaders unwilling 
to support direct political action, labour’s role and 
influence within the CCF remained marginal.
The advent of the Second World War, however, 
permanently changed the nature of CCF-labour relations. 
Industrial expansion and full employment was realized during 
the war years because Canada had to supply itself and its 
allies with the necessary supplies to defeat the Axis 
powers. Rapid industrial expansion also led to a sizeable 
increase in the number of industrial unions in Canada.
These industrial unions, many of which were organized by the 
“ •»—. Communists, were increasingly militant and politically
active. In 1940, they formed the CCL and in less than three
years the new organization endorsed the CCF. With 
significant labour backing and a growing number of 
supporters and members, the CCF appeared on the verge of 
assuming power in the upcoming 1945 election. The governing 
Liberals, however, spoiled any plans that the CCF may have
had. The Liberals responded to the CCF threat by making key
concessions to labour. They also forged an alliance with 
the Communists in a number of key industrial constituencies 
in order to defeat the CCF.
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The CCF's disappointing showing during the 1945 
election forced the party to re-examine its political 
strategy. The CCF’s left-wing argued that the more moderate 
position expressed in the pages of the 1944 manifesto was to 
blame. The party’s leaders, however, were committed to 
steering the CCF further towards the political centre. The 
second part of this chapter has illustrated why the CCF 
decided to draft and approve the more moderate Winnipeg 
Declaration of Principles to supersede the party's Regina 
Manifesto. The CCF hoped that a more moderate political 
platform would attract the growing numbers of middle class 
Canadians and trade unionists. Although the CCF’s electoral 
fortunes continued to decline, trade union leaders were 
increasingly supportive of the party. The merger between 
the TLC and the CCL to form the CLC provided the CCF with 
much needed financial support. During the following years 
the CCF, with cooperation from the CLC, created the NDP. 
Despite the fanfare associated with the announcement of the 
new party, the NDP failed to make the electoral gains it had 
hoped for during its first election campaign in 1962. Many 
of the party's members grew increasingly critical of its 
closer ties with the labour movement. They also argued that 
the NDP's acceptance of the welfare state, instead of 
socialism, contributed to the party's electoral woes.
The third, and final, section of this chapter examined 
the NDP's electoral performance from the 1960s to the 1980s
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and the party’s relationship with organized labour. The 
NDP’s relationship with labour became increasingly 
controversial. By the late 1960s the Waffle faction within 
the NDP urged that the party return to its socialist roots. 
On the other hand, the party’s leadership appeared committed 
to the principles of closer ties with labour and political 
moderation. Did the NDP ultimately benefit electorally 
because of its closer ties to organized labour? Using 
selected years, table 1.2 illustrated that rank and file 
trade unionists did not support the NDP over the Liberals 
and Conservatives. Moreover, the data from table 1.3 showed 
that the number of Canadians belonging to affiliated unions 
were always small when compared to the size of the country's 
total union membership. In terms of financial 
contributions, table 1.4 showed that union dues from 
affiliation were minor, yet steady, whereas other union 
contributions tended to be sizeable although only during 
election years.
Part three of this chapter examined the changes that 
occurred within the labour movement between 1963 to 1988. 
Additionally, by the mid-1970s the CLC, now dominated by 
these national unions, supported the NDP more 
enthusiastically than ever before. As mentioned, however, 
this enthusiasm failed to spill over and influence the 
voting preferences of the rank and file.
Clearly, then, the analysis has demonstrated that there
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are many factors which have influenced the nature and scope 
of NDP-labour relations. At times, labour has perceived 
its relationship with the NDP as advantageous. Still, there 
have been other times when labour has distanced itself from 
the party. The NDP, however, has been more consistent with 
its position. The party has always welcomed labour's 
support while at the same time it has guarded against 
possible trade union domination. Finally, it is important 
to note that NDP-labour relations have been determined 
mostly by the various leaders of these two organizations. 
Consequently, even when NDP-labour relations were good, the 
voting behaviour of rank and file trade unionists did not 
alter greatly. By contrast, many of the NDP’s traditional 
supporters grew disillusioned because of the party's 
abandonment of the socialist cause. Interestingly, the 
following chapters will show that NDP-labour relations have 
endured many of these same qualities during the 1990s. This 
chapter, therefore, has provided the foundation necessary 
for the remainder of this study.
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This chapter provides a review of the literature 
regarding NDP-labour relations from 1938 to 1995. Included 
in this chapter are various newspaper articles, books, NDP 
documents including renewal conference literature, and 
various labour discussion papers. As discussed in chapter 
one, NDP-labour relations have always been dynamic and 
complicated. At times, for instance, labour has been 
divided over its role in politics. During the 1930s and 
1940s industrial unions were more politically active than 
their craft union counterparts from the TLC. By the 1960s 
and 1970s, the growth of the national union led by the 
public sector unions, sparked the re-emergence of a more 
militant and politically active labour movement.
The growth of the public sector unions has had a 
profound impact on labour-NDP relations in the 1990s. This 
is because provincial NDP governments have been faced with 
either downsizing the public service, to the dismay of their 
traditional union supporters, or maintaining the status quo, 
thus angering the majority of the electorate. The 
literature clearly points to the fact that when in 
government, the dynamics which influence party-labour 
relations change dramatically. As well, literature probing 
into the NDP's organizational structure, its presence and 
influence in Quebec, and its ideological orientation are
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also discussed.
In addition, this chapter exposes the multitude of 
factors which have compelled the NDP and organized labour to 
re-examine their role with one another. More specifically, 
the serious decline of the federal NDP during the 1993 
election has led many within the labour movement and the NDP 
to doubt the value of a continued relationship. Not all 
segments of the labour movement, however, are critical of 
the NDP. For example, the literature review will show that 
most private-sector unions continue to remain loyal to the 
NDP. Thus, there are divisions within the labour movement 
as to whether it is politically advantageous to have ties 
with the NDP. Similarly, the NDP has openly questioned what 
labour's role within the party, if any, should be. Lastly, 
and most importantly, it can be clearly drawn from the ‘ 
review of the literature that NDP-labour tensions stem from 
a number of organizational deficiencies. These 
organizational deficiencies not only adversely effect NDP- 
labour relations, they also impair the federal party's 
ability to devise a coherent political strategy.
The Political Party: A Theoretical Perspective
A theoretical explanation of the role political parties 
play in society, as well as their organizational structure, 
is an extremely valuable prerequisite for the understanding 
of the pertinent factors which have shaped NDP-labour 
relations in the 1990s. After all, political parties are in
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fact organizations which have their own internal authority 
structures and decision-making capacities.
The political party must contend with a number of 
organizational dilemmas. It must maintain organizational 
continuity and hierarchical stability, while at the same 
time, it must offer incentives to various sub-groups and 
individuals in order to receive support.(1) Angelo 
Panebianco contends that a political party must offer both 
collective and selective incentives in order to avoid intra­
party conflict.(2) Under the collective incentives theory 
one participates because he/she shares the same political or 
social goals as the party's other participants. Selective 
incentives, on the other hand, describe the benefits 
received by only some members for their participation, such 
as promotion within the party's hierarchy.
The political party must counterbalance the 
distribution of selective incentives with collective 
incentives because one works against the other.(3) Party 
elites, for instance, often participate with the expectation 
of personal reward. Their dedication to the organization 
therefore is not for the exclusive purpose of advancing the 
organization's principles. Personal ambition, however, must 
not disrupt the organization's ideology or "cause" because 
it conceals the distribution of selective incentives from 
those who do not benefit.(4) This is an important point 
because it explains, in part, why during periods of
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ideological change, intra-party conflict within the NDP has 
erupted. Most notably, the transition from CCF to NDP 
angered many party members, as well as the party's socialist 
wing, because it was seen as an attempt by the party to 
strengthen its ties with labour at their expense. These 
internal divisions in fact plagued the NDP until the 
expulsion of the Wafflers in the early 1970s. On the other 
hand, it could also be argued that since there were no 
significant structural differences between the CCF and its 
successor the NDP, the NDP successfully distributed a 
collective incentive to labour while concealing the 
distribution of selective incentives to non-labour members. 
Indeed, labour's representation whether at party conventions 
or on Federal Council did not change after the party’s 
transition from the CCF to the NDP.
Panebianco's organizational analysis also sheds light 
on why NDP-labour relations appear to deteriorate when the 
party forms the government. This is because when in 
government, the importance of adhering to the party’s 
ideology and its principles are not considered as important 
as the managerial responsibilities associated with 
governing. As a result, many of those participants once 
united by a common cause become alienated when it becomes 
clear that the party is incapable of implementing all of its 
promises. Thus, the collective incentive for many members 
is lost and consequently a party loses rank and file
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
support.
Similarly, Samuel Eldersveld, whose research has 
focused on party structure, argues: "The party is a
mutually exploitative relationship - it is joined by those 
who would use it; it mobilizes for the sake of power those 
who would join it."(5) Clearly, the relationships between 
the party and its various supporters is seen in a similar 
fashion not only between Eldersveld and Panebianco, but with 
Goldman's transaction analysis, as well. All three believe 
that the party must offer some form of incentive to 
attractive participants, and that the participants must 
likewise offer something of value to the party in return. 
Therefore, when examining NDP-labour relations, it is 
important to uncover what the gains and losses have been for 
~*L~TDdth sides under the rules which have defined the parameters 
of their relationship.
Party Structure
The NDP is unique in its structural composition when 
compared to Canada's traditional parties. Unlike the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, the NDP is an integrated 
party which means that there is no clear separation (with 
the exception of the NDP's Quebec wing) between its 
provincial and federal wings. Consequently, any person who 
chooses to join the NDP automatically becomes a member of 
both the federal party and the provincial party. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
serious decline of the federal NDP has led many within the 
party to re-examine its organizational structure. For 
example, should the party be more centralized or 
decentralized? Is the NDP's financial structure placing the 
federal party at a disadvantage in relation to its 
provincial wings? Lastly,should there be structural changes 
in order to improve how the NDP formulates its policies?
Alan Sharp, maintains that a major problem with the NDP 
is that the Federal Party does not know who its members are. 
Under the party's current constitution the provincial wings 
have control of the membership lists. Sharp contends that 
the Federal Party must be given these membership lists so 
that it can communicate with its members more directly. In 
addition to Sharp's article, Brian Harling's Why Separate 
Federal and Provincial Memberships Won't Work and Marion 
Dewar's Restructuring of the New Democratic Party of Canada, 
argue for a stronger federal wing as well. The main issue 
is centred around money. Currently, the Federal Party 
receives 15 per cent of all revenues raised by the 
provincial wing as its main source of money.(6) As well, 
the NDP's provincial wings are responsible for giving 60 
percent of the monies collected from its affiliated trade 
unions to the federal NDP.(7) Since the Federal Party 
relies on the provincial wing for its revenues derived from 
provincial membership lists, it is clear why the federal 
party wants access to them. As Sharp points out: "Some
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means must be found for the Federal Party to have its own 
membership lists, and to be free to organize them, 
communicate with them and ask them directly for money.”(8)
By contrast, many provincial leaders, described by 
Whitehorn as feudal barons,(9) are opposed to the prospect 
of having to compete with the Federal Party for funds. 
According to Ian McLeod, the provinces often fall behind in 
their payments to the Federal Party.(10) The Federal Party, 
unfortunately, does not have the authority to force the 
provincial sections to pay. In fact, during the mid-1980s 
many provinces had fallen so far behind in their payments 
that the Federal Party worked out an agreement which saw it 
receive $1.00 for every $2.00 owed.(11) For obvious reasons 
this dependence on the party's provincial wings has made it 
difficult for the Federal Party to plan its own budget both 
during election and non-elections years. Moreover, the 
financial committee of the Federal Party is made up of the 
NDP's provincial and territorial treasurers.(12) In other 
words, those responsible for approving Federal Party 
expenditures are the same people who have often fallen 
behind in their payments to the Federal Party.
The legality of the NDP's rules outlining party finance 
is also open to question. The passage of the Elections 
Expenses Act in 1974 was intended to permit federal 
political parties to issue tax exemption receipts for 
political donations. However, because the NDP's provincial
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wings are responsible for handling membership funds, in 
actual fact, the federal exemption has helped the NDP's 
provincial wings. When considering that the provinces have 
fallen behind in their payments to the Federal Party, while 
at the same time benefitting from a federal tax exemption, 
it is obvious why some New Democrats are dissatisfied with 
the current financial arrangement.
Another contentious issue surrounding the NDP's 
organizational structure is that the provincial presence 
within the Federal Party is increased further during 
election campaigns. McLeod points out that "The provincial 
offices house the field organizers and co-ordinate much of 
the federal election advertising and federal worker 
training."(13) As well, the Strategy and Election Planning 
Committee (SEPC), which becomes the key body of the party 
during federal elections, includes many imports from its 
provincial wings.
In addition to being comprised of many provincial party 
staffers, the SEPC was expanded to 50 members by the 1993 
federal election. The expansion of the SEPC was in response 
to labour's criticisms that it did not have an adequate 
voice within the decision-making process during the 1988 
campaign.(14) Moreover, Whitehorn points out that because 
of its large size, the SEPC had a number of smaller 
steering committees. The roost important of these committees 
in 1993 was the 14 person election platform committee. This
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committee was responsible for creating a political platform 
from the hundreds of resolutions presented at NDP 
conventions.(15) Although the expansion of the SEPC was 
designed to give party members a greater voice in the 
decision-making process, its large si2e diminished the 
likelihood of achieving the consensus necessary for 
developing a coherent electoral platform.
The process by which resolutions are passed within the 
NDP also contributes to the party's inability to develop an 
articulate a coherent political message. Historically, 
resolutions presented at party conventions have come from 
local NDP ridings. As a result, hundreds of various 
resolutions reach the convention floor. However, few of 
these resolutions are actually discussed because a 
Resolutions Committee is responsible for deciding which 
resolutions will actually be debated.(16) According to 
Sharp, this is a "morale sapping process" because it 
prevents the discussion of controversial topics.(17) In 
short, then, policy development within the NDP, although 
encouraged, is significantly controlled by the party’s 
elite. Moreover, the introduction of hundreds of 
resolutions at party conventions complicates and frustrates 
the party’s ability to formulate a clear and concise 
political platform.
The NDP's integrated structure has also frustrated the 
Federal Party's electoral fortunes because it is
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incompatible with the realities of Canadian federalism. The 
premise behind the NDP's integrated model is that its 
members are united by their social democratic beliefs. In 
reality, however, the views of social democrats in rural 
Saskatchewan, for instance, are different from those in 
Ontario. This reality has further complicated the Federal 
Party's ability to develop policies because the differences 
between its provincial wings translate into a mishmash of 
policy proposals. As Steve Lee points out: The Integrated
Party is not realistic given the profoundly regional, 
decentralized and federal nature of Canada.,r (18) As well, 
Nelson Riis, one of the few federal NDP MPs to retain his 
seat after the 1993 election, describes the federal NDP as 
"a collection of provincial organizations whose first 
thought is not the federal party and often not Canada.^(19) 
Clearly, the value of the NDP's integrated structure is 
questionable, and now seriously challenged following the 
Federal Party's dismal electoral showing in 1993.
Although the party established the Council of Fer‘ lural 
Ridings (CFR) in 1990 to encourage greater focus on federal 
issues, this new body has few powers. Donna Shire contends 
that the CFR's did not have direct access to the local 
ridings, nor did they have a notable presence within the 
SEPC.(20) Thus, the presence of the CFR's were more 
symbolic than practical. Moreover, the establishment of the 
CFR's has, according to Whitehorn, swelled the number of
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Federal Council members from 150 to an unmanageable 200.(21) 
Clearly, then, while the CFR's have produced few tangible 
benefits for the Federal Party, their presence has only 
added another layer to an already overweight and complicated 
bureaucratic structure.
The integrated structure of the NDP has also meant that 
the Federal Party’s popularity has often been directly 
related to the popularity of NDP provincial governments. In 
1993, the unpopularity of the Ontario NDP government, for 
instance, had a profound impact on the electoral fortunes of 
the Federal Party. Many of the Federal Party's traditional 
labour supporters either reduced or diverted their 
contributions originally allocated to the Federal Party 
because of the social contract legislation passed by the NDP 
in Ontario.(22) Therefore, in addition to examining NDP- 
labour relations at the federal level, it is also necessary 
to examine the dynamics of this relationship at the 
provincial level, as well.
Party Leadership
Literature which examined the role, and the impact, of 
the NDP's last two leaders, Ed Broadbent and Audrey 
McLaughlin, was also reviewed. In Judy Steed's Ed 
Broadbent: The Pursuit of Power, there is a very
sympathetic evaluation of Broadbent's leadership of the NDP. 
Steed points out that the party had its best ever showing
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under Broadbent's reign, citing examples that the NDP had 
reached a record high support rating in the summer of 1987 
(44%), and won a record number of seats and popular vote in 
the 1988 election.(23) Robert Campbell and Leslie Pal, 
however, in The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics, second 
edition, note that Broadbent's support for the Meech Lake 
Accord angered many of the party's traditional supporters 
such as Aboriginals, women's groups, and labour.(24) 
Additionally, Whitehorn criticizes Broadbent for becoming 
too cautious and dependent on polling as the party grew in 
popularity. He also accuses Broadbent and his advisors of 
not taking a strong stance against free trade in 1988 for 
the purpose of making political gains in Quebec because most 
Quebecers were in favour of free trade.(25) This position 
not only failed to lead to electoral gains in Quebec for the 
NDP, but it also caused a serious rift between labour 
leaders, strongly opposed to the Free Trade deal, and the 
party.
Audrey McLaughlin was elected to succeed Broadbent 
during the NDP's 1989 leadership convention. McLaughlin, an 
outspoken opponent of the Meech Lake Accord and the only 
female candidate to run for the party's leadership, defeated 
Dave Barrett after a long battle on the fourth ballot. 
According to McLeod, McLaughlin received the support of most 
of the labour delegates at the convention, including two of 
Canada's most prominent labour leaders, Bob White and
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Steelworkers director Leo Gerard.(26) Labour’s support for 
McLaughlin, however, declined steadily during the period 
leading up to the 1993 election campaign. Labour leaders 
became increasingly agitated over McLaughlin’s apparent 
unwillingness to criticize the Rae government’s performance 
in Ontario. McLeod points out that labour was angered by 
McLaughlin's initial refusal to criticize Rae's social 
contract legislation.(27) Consequently, labour's enthusiasm 
for the federal NDP diminished substantially in terms of 
personnel support and financial contributions. More 
importantly, emerging out of the ashes of the federal NDP's 
electoral performance was a great deal of mistrust between 
the party and many unions within the Canadian labour 
movement.
The NDP in Quebec: Le Neant
The NDP has never been much of a political force in 
Quebec. Electoral support for the NDP's predecessor, the 
CCF, during election time averaged only 1.5 per cent from 
1935 to 1958. (28) Moreover, Whitehorn notes that in 
successive elections from 1962 to 1988, the NDP managed to 
obtain on average only 8.1 per cent of the total vote in 
Quebec. In fact, the NDP has only won one seat in Quebec, 
that during a 1990 by-election in Chambly. Electoral data 
obtained from Frizzell, Pammett and Westell show that the 
sole NDP incumbent in Quebec, Phil Edmonston, did not run
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for re-election during the 1993 federal election.
Incidently, on election night the Bloc Quebecois candidate 
received 59.7 percent of the vote in Chambly while the New 
Democrat candidate received only 2.9 percent of the 
vote.(29) According to McLeod, the NDP in Quebec received 
less than 2 percent of the vote and eighteen of its 
candidates in fact collected fewer votes than the Natural 
Law Party in 1993.(30)
NDP-labour relations within the province of Quebec have 
also been particularly weak. Archer- indicates that as of 
1985 only 12 union locals were affiliated to the NDP in 
Quebec, accounting for only 1.6 per cent of affiliated 
locals nationwide.(31) Why have ties between the NDP and 
the labour movement been largely insignificant in the 
province of Quebec? Robert Laxer explains that the labour 
movement in Quebec has been distinct and increasingly 
separate from labour organizations in the rest of 
Canada.(32) The powerful Confederation of National Trade 
Unions (CNTU), made up of mostly public sector unions, and 
the Union of Quebec Teachers (Corporation des enseignents du 
Quebec or CEQ) are two of the largest labour organizations 
in Quebec, and neither of these two organizations are 
affiliated to the CLC. According to Laxer, the nationalism 
of Quebec labour "...was focussed mainly on the domination 
of Quebec by the Canadian federal state."(33) Not 
surprisingly, then, a significant number of labour unions in
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Quebec support the sovereignty option. In fact, a Toronto 
Star article, written by Robert McKenzie on March 26, 1995 
described the CNTU's president, Gerald Larose, as "one of 
the most ardent supporters of the sovereigntist cause."(34) 
Moreover, formal ties between labour and the NDP, and 
electoral support for the party in Quebec have been almost 
non-existent. For these reasons this study will, for the 
most part, exclude the province of Quebec.
Ideology and the NDP
In an article written in the Toronto Star, Steven 
Langdon states, referring to the NDP, that: "The future
will result from the same activism and on-the-ground 
struggle that built progressive political movements 
throughout Canada's history."(35) Moreover, Langdon's 
argument is that the Party needs to be more active rather 
than just debating political philosophy like the Liberals 
and Conservatives. This sentiment is echoed by many other 
party members, including Eugene Kostyra. Kostyra, one of 
the party's regional directors, contends that the NDP has to 
differentiate itself from the other parties and that "...it 
must be truly a left Party...."It must understand that there 
is a ruling class and a working class and it must govern on 
the side of the working class."(36) While, Kostyra's 
sentiment reflects a common position within the NDP, 
empirical research indicates "—  that the party
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conventions today may not have as strong a working-class 
base as in the past."(37). For example, Whitehorn and 
Archer, on the basis of NDP convention studies, indicate 
that 31.6% of Party members consider themselves as lower- 
middle, working or lower class. By contrast, 68.5% of those 
surveyed were described as upper, upper-middle, or middle 
class (47.3% considered themselves middle class, 20.5% 
classified themselves as upper-middle class, and 0.7% 
considered themselves as upper-class).(38)
It appears that the changing face of NDP members has 
had an impact on the Party and its policies. This is not to 
suggest that a person's class necessarily reflects how 
he/she stands on a certain issue. Rather, it does suggest 
that it becomes increasingly more difficult for the NDP to 
hold on to principles that may be seen now as obsolete 
because of the ever changing mix of an already diverse and 
dynamic membership and electorate. The Whitehorn-Archer 
study also points to some important differences of opinion 
among convention delegates in 1987. For example, when 
asked if the NDP should move more clearly to the left 39.9% 
agreed while 37.9% disagreed.(39) Furthermore, 63.3% of 
convention delegates, in 1987, agreed that there were 
significant differences between the left and the right 
within the Party.(40) Not surprisingly, the miserable 
showing made by the NDP during the 1993 election has made 
these differences more profound, and at the same time, more
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public. This is because each side has chosen to blame the 
other for the NDP's serious electoral decline.
While some prominent NDPers, such as Party secretary 
Fraser Green, suggest that the post-October era opens the 
door to turn "crisis into opportunity,"(41) the fact of the 
matter is that there is a great deal of potential for 
conflict between various groups within the Party over its 
future. Stephen Langdon, for example, is critical of the 
national party executive for deciding unilaterally to cancel 
the 1994 convention. This, Langdon argues, has meant that 
the executive elected in 1991 still controls the party 
despite its decline. He describes the executive membership 
as the "...same questionable group, who took the party from 
a 30 per cent popular rating...in 1989...to just over 7 per 
cent in 1993."(42) The prospects, however, for conflict 
should not be overstated because despite the differences in 
opinion on specific issues, there is a general consensus 
that the Party stands for social justice and equality. Once 
again, referring to NDP delegates, Whitehorn and Archer, 
for instance, argue that members of the NDP were further 
'left' than their Liberal and Conservative counterparts.(43) 
For the purpose of this study, this information is important 
to keep in mind because it demonstrates that the terms 
'left' and 'right* are being used in the context of the NDP 
only and not within the broader Canadian political spectrum.
Articles written by a number of NDP members indicate
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that the building blocks for renewal do exist. Pat Lorje 
states, in an article presented at the August renewal 
conference, that: "We can't always agree with each other,
but we share a passionate belief that we can somehow create 
a perfect community for all people. Not just for a 
privileged minority."(44) Lorje then admits that the party 
has difficulty in identifying who the NDP should represent. 
Moreover, Lorje is critical of the Party for blindly 
supporting certain issues without any debate. Examples used 
by Lorje include; to be a supporter of the left you must 
oppose free trade, support all social programs and argue for 
the maintenance of universality for these programs, and you 
must support the expansion of the social safety net. Lorje 
concludes her article by appealing to the Party for "no 
labels" and to avoid special interest thinking when 
discussing strategies and solutions.
Howard Pawley suggests that democratic socialism has 
been put on the defensive by the neo-conservatives even 
though issues such as poverty and unemployment have become 
dominant in the 1990s. Pawley argues that the Party 
"...appeared ambiguous in [its] articulation of an 
alternative agenda..."(45) and that "...the collapse of 
communism was interpreted not as an indictment of 
totalitarianism but rather that of socialism."(46) Clearly, 
then, Pawley's article suggests that the Party’s failure is 
both a product of political strategy and of ideology in the
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post-Cold War era. Moreover, he proposes that the NDP offer 
Canadians an alternative vision, for example the extension 
of the Goods and Services Tax to financial services.(47) 
Pawley concludes by advocating that the NDP become more of a 
mass party.
Duncan Cameron, in his editorial in the Canadian Forum,
believes that the NDP has a choice between two political
strategies:
It can follow its provincial government 
wings and adopt a centre-left stance, in 
the belief that no one can outflank the 
NDP on the left; or it can plant its flag 
clearly on the left, and work within the 
universe of those who are the natural 
constituencies of the NDP.(48)
Cameron sees the latter strategy as more appropriate because
it is seen as the best way to build community support. He
points out that building community support should start with
strengthening the party's relationship with the labour
movement. A number of questions stem from Cameron's
argument. Will the NDP have to change its organizational
structure to accommodate various local interests, including
the labour movement, necessary for building community
support? Or, will the NDP formulate a political platform
that aggressively represents the needs of various community
groups?
James Laxer concentrates his criticism towards the 
neo-conservatives for attempting to manipulate people into 
thinking that Government is the problem. Instead, Laxer
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contends that governments have a positive role to play in 
the economy, such as creating jobs, rather than supporting 
the costs of unemployment and underemployment. It is 
Laxer's opinion that neo-conservative policies such as free 
trade, and the encouragement of globalization, have led to 
less government revenues and more expenditures to people who 
need assistance. Laxer uses data from Statistics Canada to 
illustrate the sorry state of working people in Canada. For 
example in 1992, only "... 31% of all workers had full 
time, year round jobs, which paid more than $30,000 a 
year.(49) And, " —  42% of workers were employed part time, 
full time or on a temporary basis, or were unemployed for 
part of the year.'1 (50) The statistical data used by Laxer 
is designed to illustrate the disastrous results of neo­
conservative policies and to reinforce his notion that if 
governments create jobs, then people would become 
contributors to the economy, as consumers and tax payers, 
instead of looking to the state for financial aid.
Therefore, it is fair to assume that Laxer sees government 
involvement in job creation as a way of cutting government 
deficits, instead of cutting jobs, expenditures, and 
government downsizing that has been occurring in the 1990s.
Persuading the general public that government 
involvement is good, however, has become increasingly 
difficult in the 1990s. For example, Alan Whitehom 
suggests that the neo-conservatism has led to increased
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taxation on the middle class and the free trade 
agreement.(51) He also points out that the constitutional 
quagmire engineered by Canada's politicians has made 
Canadians increasingly distrustful of government.
Judy Rebick considers the participation of interest 
groups and the population in general as fundamental for the 
renewal of the NDP. Rebick points to the. successes of the 
Reform Party as an example of the political benefits from 
encouraging greater public participation in politics. By 
failing to do this, Rebick argues, the perception of the 
NDP has shifted to that of a traditional party. 
Consequently, this has led to an erosion of the Party's 
support. Pawley, too, shares Rebick's opinion on this 
issue when he suggests that the Party's support for the 
Charlottetown Accord, despite public opinion on the issue, 
created an impression that the NDP was part of the elite. 
Rebick concludes by stating that "Rather than distancing 
itself from the labour movement, the Party should deepen its 
relationship with labour at the grass roots level..."(52)
The relevance of Labour cannot be ignored and will now be 
looked at in more detail.
The NDP's Relationship With Labour
The NDP's relationship with labour has been a central 
issue within the party both in the past and now at present. 
As mentioned, there are those such as Kostyra, Rebick, and 
Langdon,
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among others, who support stronger ties with labour. By 
contrast, there have been others who consider the Party's 
ties with Labour as detrimental. To examine this issue more 
closely the material reviewed uncovered a number of 
important facts which can help shed light on this subject. 
Keith Archer, indicates that the change from the CCF to NDP 
has never brought widespread support from the labour 
movement. Archer contends that the Party structure of the 
NDP has meant that affiliated unions generally comprise 
approximately 20% of convention delegates.(53) Furthermore, 
despite a public image as being the party closely aligned to 
labour, the NDP has traditionally had few unions affiliated 
to it. In fact, only 2.8% of the total Labour workforce is 
affiliated to the NDP.(54) From Archer's evidence two 
questions can be asked. First, does the lack of Labour's 
support mean that the Party should make an effort to forge 
closer ties? Or, does the lack of Labour's support make it 
more of a liability to the Party? Answering these questions 
are by no means easy because they are being asked not only 
by New Democrats but also by the labour movement.
Before discussing the current state of relations 
between the NDP and labour, it is important to see how each 
side views its relationship with the other. While some 
argue that the labour movement is merely another special 
interest group, others see the relationship as more equal 
and intimate. In a paper presented to the Canadian Labour
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with the CLC, the CCF successfully transformed itself in 
1961 into the NDP and social democracy acquired a new 
momentum."(55) In an Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) 
report, Labour's relationship is described in a similar 
fashion. The OFL report describes the relationship as a 
"partnership" and that the CLC "... adopted a resolution in 
support of the already established national committee for a 
new party, and in early 1961 they launched a campaign to 
raise funds for the founding convention."(56) Whitehorn and 
Archer, however, point out that many within the NDP have
alleged that the " conservative orientation of labour,
combined with its prominence and stature within the party, 
has effectively prevented the NDP from cultivating a 
political soil capable of nourishing the seeds of 
socialism.11 (57) Obviously, then, while some have viewed the 
NDP-Labour relationship as a partnership between equals, 
others view Labour as a hinderance to socialism because of 
the alleged conservative orientation of Labour within the 
Party.
Archer and Whitehorn test whether the labour component 
of the NDP is in fact noticeably more conservative than non­
union members. A number of questionnaires using Likert 
scales which were circulated during the 1987 NDP convention
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led Archer and Whitehorn to conclude the following:
a  The delegate entitlement policy for NDP conventions,
™  while giving labour a key presence, have not given them
a domineering role; 
a  Labour delegates have been a substantial minority,
™  overwhelmingly from Ontario, and have been mostly
blue-collar workers or union representatives and are 
mostly male;
a  In ideological terms, a majority of labour delegates
™  saw themselves as socialist or social democrat, and as
working class. Attitudes of union delegates were 
similar to those of non-union delegates, indicating no 
dramatic shift to the right.(58)
Thus, despite the critics, Archer and Whitehorn conclude 
that the views, values, and attitudes of the Labour 
representatives were similar to those of non-union Party 
members.
The differences between Labour and the NDP do not 
appear to be ideological, but why then has there been a 
great deal of tension between Labour and the NDP? According 
to Whitehorn, the reasons for tension stem from the 
differences in priorities between the two. Whitehorn 
elaborates on this point by posing the question: "Is free
collective bargaining at the top of the rankings for 
both?(59) David Mackenzie argues that the labour movement 
is simply a coalition and "Coalitions will officially feign 
non-partisanship as they diligently scrutinize party 
utterances for signs of betrayal and bad faith."(60) Could 
Mackenzie's claim explain why the labour movement has been 
so vocally opposed to the NDP in Ontario after the 
government's decision to introduce social contract
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legislation (Bill 48)? Although Bill 4S was strongly 
opposed by public sector unions, is it enough to destroy a 
relationship spanning over 30 years? Mackenzie states that 
the question which needs to be answered is: "Does the
Canadian Labour movement orient its political activity 
through an electorally-competitive social democratic party 
or does it conceive itself as essentially a partner of 
extra-parliamentary social coalitions? Party politics or 
coalition politics?"(61)
Historically, there are numerous examples where it 
appeared that the labour movement acted as an interest group 
rather than an integral part of the NDP. Although the OFL 
report states: "We believed that within the New Democratic
Party, we were part of a partnership of e q u a l s . (62) 
there are numerous examples where the Labour-NDP 
relationship has been a partnership between adversaries.
For example, when the Liberal government imposed general 
wage controls to combat inflation the labour movement was 
outraged. However, the two NDP premiers at that time 
(Blakeney and Schreyer) supported the imposition of wage 
controls.(63) Alan Whitehorn argues that despite the 
unprecedented level of support earned by the NDP from the 
1988 federal election, labour was extremely critical over 
how the campaign was run. Whitehorn notes that Canadian 
Auto Workers (CAW) president, Bob White, wrote a 7-page 
letter which described the election as "disastrous" and that
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labour's "...financial and people support is accepted 
gratefully, but its ideas and leadership are completely 
ignored."(64) Labour's anger was centred on the NDP's 
refusal to focus chiefly on the Free Trade issue.
Similarly, many labour leaders, such as Bob White, felt that
labour's representation within the SEPC was inadequate 
during the 1988 campaign.
The real problem, however, is that labour acts
simultaneously as both a partner of the NDP, as well as an
interest group. As an interest group, labour articulates 
both non-political and political demands to various 
political parties and governments. As a co-founder of the 
NDP, labour articulates its views in order to influence the 
party's policies. Unfortunately, this already complicated 
arrangement becomes even more difficult to manage when the 
NDP is in power. This is because when in government the NDP 
assumes a managerial role while labour's role as an interest 
group does not change. Not surprisingly, NDP-labour 
relations have tended to sour when the NDP is the governing 
party.
The NDP's organizational structure, unfortunately, does 
not appropriately accommodate the fact that labour is both a 
co-founder and an interest group. This explains, in part, 
why very few union locals have actually affiliated with the 
NDP. Is there a way in which the NDP could allow labour to 
function more independently within the NDP? Obviously, with
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under 3 percent of the labour movement affiliated to the 
party, the wide array of views held by labour throughout 
Canada are not being sufficiently heard.
The issue of voter support is also important in 
understanding Labour-NDP tension. Archer provides 
statistical data indicating that members from unions 
affiliated to the NDP have traditionally voted in greater 
numbers for the Liberal Party than they have for the 
NDP-(65) Likewise, non-affiliated union members have 
preferred the Liberal party over the NDP. Therefore, in 
terms of electoral support, labour has not been as valuable 
an ally for the NDP as might be desired. However, Archer is 
quick to point out that Labour's contributions in terms of 
money and personnel are significant. Trade union 
contributions are second only to that of individuals in 
terms of total party revenues.(66) Second, 552 Locals and 
75.7% of all affiliated union members reside in Ontario.(67) 
Therefore, the NDP without the Labour movement in Ontario 
would be severely weakened in terms of revenues and 
personnel. A weakened Ontario branch of the NDP would 
severely limit the Party’s chances of remaining a national 
party.
Despite tensions between the labour movement and the 
NDP, the repercussions of a split would be significant. 
Mackenzie states, "The health and survival of organized 
labour is closely bound up with the health of the democratic
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left as a whole, in Canada and elsewhere...the Canadian 
labour movement needs the discipline of building a social 
democratic party...M (68) John Young argues that "The NDP 
grew out of the union of the western cooperative farm 
movement and the central Canadian labour movement. In spite 
of the tensions between different elements within the Party, 
this uneasy marriage still represents our greatest 
strength."(69) Therefore judging from the literature there 
appears general agreement that while the Labour-NDP 
relationship is a difficult one, ending this relationship 
would not benefit either the Party or the labour movement.
In order to understand NDP-labour relations in greater 
depth, and from the perspective of labour, a number of CAW 
discussion papers were reviewed. These discussion papers, 
presented at the CAW's 4th constitutional convention in 
Quebec City (August 23-2 5, 1994), included a variety of 
proposals which indicated a willingness by the CAW to 
transform itself and its relationship with the NDP. In a 
Toronto Star article, Tony Van Alphen described the CAW's 
convention as "confusing" and ambiguous with respect to 
the union's position over the NDP.(70) In fact, however, 
the CAW's position is similar to that of most NDP members. 
This is because both sides agree that it would not be 
advantageous for a formal split between the NDP and labour 
to occur.
The first discussion paper, titled VJhere are the
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Changes in Our Union Taking Us?, is primarily a self re­
examination of the union. The paper indicates the union's 
dissatisfaction with the NDP: "Precisely at a time when we
so desperately need an effective political voice to 
articulate our needs and mobilize frustrations, the 
disappointing truth is that the NDP has not been up to the 
task-"(71) Further, according to the paper, the 
fundamental strength of the union is that it has been built 
in the workplace. Consequently, the union has to be more 
active in the workplace and begin to play "...the 
leadership role in fighting for jobs," in what is described 
as "Movement Unionism"(72) Thus, the paper advocates a more 
active CAW that represents and protects all working people 
from governments who act in the interests of the corporate 
elite.
The second discussion paper, titled Labour and
Politics: Rethinking, Redefining, Rebuilding, reviews
Labour's relationship with the NDP. Emphasis is placed on
the significance of the social contract legislation in
Ontario as the main issue behind the union's re-examination
of the Labour—NDP relationship. The discussion paper also
addresses a nurbor of questions:
« What's the alternative?Why did the Reform Party, so fundamentally opposed to the values and needs of organize working people, 
receive more votes from unionized workers than did the 
NDP during the 1993 election? 
a  Why are we (the left) rather than they (the right) on 
^  the defensive?
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Why in Ontario is the government / party not fighting 
against our powerful enemies?
Why hasn't labour been able to deliver the vote?
Are we just another interest group, concerned with 
elections to consolidate our own gains? 
a  Had we decided, in 1961, to work towards the long term
™  building of a socialist constituency - rather than
winning the next election - would we be better off 
politically than we are today?
The paper is critical of the Ontario NDP for "...sounding
like other governments, making judgements based on
expediency, and putting the main focus on the deficit."(73)
Furthermore, the result of this action, in effect, shows
the populace that the right is correct in its view that
debt, deficit, and downsizing should be the government's
priority. The Ontario government, instead of following the
corporate agenda, should offer an alternative vision that
could move people and unite them against the corporate
elite. After all, according to the discussion paper, "The
right has controlled the economic and social agenda for the
last fifteen years. It has had its chance to try out
solutions, and it has failed miserably."(74)
Several proposals of how the union could help revive
the Party are addressed. First, educational programs need
to be designed so that the public can better understand the
labour movement. Second, union activity should be increased
at the local level, in the community and community
struggles. Third, the union should play a leadership role
in taking on the economic and political establishments.
Obviously, then, the CAW discussion papers indicate
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dissatisfaction with the NDP. However, there does not 
appear to be an explicit declaration of disassociation with 
the federal party. The CAW discussion papers also indicate 
a commitment by the union to play a more active role in the 
community and in politics separate from the NDP.
The lack of political alternatives to the NDP,
although significant, is not the only issue to be considered 
when looking at NDP-labour tensions. According to John 
Young, a rift between some private sector unions and public
sector unions continues to deepen. Therefore, labour itself
is divided with regard to its relationship with the NDP. In 
fact, many private sector unions affiliated to the NDP have 
no intention to alter their relationship with the Party. 
Referring to Tony Van Alphen’s article, many private sector 
unions "...have indicated they will work actively for the 
party (The Ontario NDP) because of labor reforms and other 
legislation that help workers."(75) Even the OFL report, 
which was highly critical of the NDP, referred to Bill 40 
(reform of the Ontario Labour Relations Act) as seme of the 
most progressive labour legislation in North America.(76)
In Rethinking our Mission in Ontario: A Discussion
Paper, for Union Leaders (circulated at the August renewal 
conference - author unknown), there is a scathing report of 
the OFL*s decision to alter its relationship with the NDP in 
Ontario. In this paper, the OFL is criticized for 
"quibbling” over unimportant issues at a time when the
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Labour movement should be acting in "The larger interests of 
Ontario's working people."(77) The OFL's affixation on 
Bill 48 has weakened the labour movement's overall strength 
to fight against the corporate agenda. The real issues are 
defined in the paper as being free trade and unemployment: 
"The steep decline in employment in central Canada's 
private-sector manufacturing industries is paralleled by a 
steep decline in the position and strength of industrial 
unions."(78) The decline of industrial unions (private 
sector) explains why "...the noise that can be generated 
over relatively-recent public spending cutbacks and job 
reductions far exceeds what labour has been able to sustain 
over the more catastrophic and economically-debilitating 
losses in mines, paper mills, appliance plants, and clothing 
manufacturers over the past decade and a half."(79) Thus, 
in addition to differences in priorities between labour and 
the NDP, there is also a difference in priorities between 
some private and public sector unions.
In fact, the report describes the divide between 
public and private sector unions in the movement as deep: 
"The CAW-public sector alignment is a formidable, commanding 
presence, and increasingly its political interests and 
policy views differ sharply with the rest of the large 
goods-and-service unions— "(80) The CAW-public sector 
alignment is accused of being uninterested in thinking about 
new strategies for creating public wealth and increasing
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industrial activity. Rather, according to the report,
"those organizations (public sector unions) are more 
interested in — defend-the-status quo-at-all-costs approach 
to their s e c t o r . (81) Instead, the CAW-public sector 
alliance should consider strengthening its alliance with the 
NDP rather than trying to break Labour’s formal linkage with 
the party: "Political renewal is only possible, re­
energizing social democracy is only possible, if labour 
takes a good hard look at itself."(82)
Leo Gerard, International Secretary - Treasurer - cf 
the United Steelworkers of America argues that labour's 
relationship with the NDP should continue. He contends that 
to respond effectively to the right wing, labour must, 
instead of criticizing the NDP, maintain its commitment to 
the Party and develop further electoral strategies.(83). 
Gerard is critical of others who have withdrawn their 
support of provincial NDP governments. His message, 
therefore, is one of unity in order to effectively counter 
the powerful neo-conservative forces.
Eugene Kostyra, explains that when the NDP was formed 
there were very few union members in public sector unions 
that were in the CLC.(84) The various provincial components 
of what is now the National Union of Public and General 
Workers were not part of the CLC at that time. As a result, 
"Today a large majority of union members belong to those 
public sector unions which do net have many local unions
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affiliated to the NDP."(85) Farther, when the NDP is 
elected to govern, the NDP becomes the employer of these 
non- affiliated public sector unions and subsequently the 
potential for conflict (ie. Bill 48) increases dramatically 
when the government is faced with difficult fiscal 
constraints. Kostyra believes that the relationship 
between public sector unions and the NDP could be 
strengthened by including more union members in the Party. 
However, given the current relationship, it seems highly 
unlikely that public sector unions and their members would 
enthusiastically join the NDP. First, the Labour movement 
itself, which appears fragmented between the CAW and public 
sector unions versus private sector unions, must agree 
amongst themselves on a united strategy before there can be 
any strengthening of ties between the Party and Labour. 
Second, if the divisions between some private and public 
sector unions intensify, how will the Party bridge the gap 
between the two or will it, in fact, have to choose sides 
between two substantively different ideological views?(86) 
Alan Whitehorn asks, "Is a new party system emerging? 
If so, what should the role of labour be in the newly 
emerging party system?"(87) Whitehorn looks at a number of 
issues which must be examined before making a decision over 
whether greater labour participation is plausible or 
desirable. Like Kostyra, Whitehorn is inclined to believe 
that greater union involvement within the Party is
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necessary. Greater involvement in terms of union personnel 
at NDP conventions, in constituency ridings, and on the 
SEPC must be considered. As Whitehorn points out: "It is a
curious fact in a party co-founded by the labour movement 
that no labour leader has run for the leadership of the 
NDP."(88)
Conclusion of Literature Review
The literature which was reviewed uncovered a number of 
issues relevant to the NDP-labour relationship. The 
disappointing electoral result in 1993 has forced New 
Democrats and labour to recognize past mistakes, while 
looking to possible solutions for rebuilding the party in 
the future. The literature review clearly demonstrated that 
many segments within the labour movement have become 
increasingly dissatisfied with their role and influence 
within the NDP. A variety of perspectives have been 
presented from party members, academics, and labour leaders. 
Judging from the literature reviewed, there appears to be 
little agreement with regard to the future status of the 
NDP-Labour relationship. Must this relationship be changed, 
maintained, or ended?
It is important to note that missing in the literature 
review are the views of rank and file trade unionists. Not 
surprisingly, this apparent failure to listen to their own 
members’ views on political issues partially explains why
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labour leaders have had very little impact on the voting 
behaviour of their members. As well, the NDP in the 1990s 
has driven away many of its supporters because of its 
inability to formulate a coherent and workable political 
program.
The literature review clearly uncovered evidence which 
suggests that the organizational structure of the NDP has 
contributed to the party's electoral decline and its souring 
relationship with labour. The viability of the NDP's 
integrated structure, its financial structure, and its rules 
dictating policy development are all suspect and warrant 
further investigation. The following chapters, therefore, 
will address these problems and from them construct an 
alternative, and more practical, organizational model for 
the NDP.
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THE 1993 FEDERAL ELECTION
CHAPTER THREE
The serious decline of the federal NDP during the 1993 
campaign has required the party to re-examine itself. 
Certainly, there are many factors responsible for the NDP's 
decline. Some people, such as Howard Pawley and Judy 
Rebick, have argued that the NDP failed miserably in 1993 
because it was seen as simply another traditional party, no 
different than the Conservatives or the Liberals. Still 
others, such as Steven Langdon, have suggested that the 
federal NDP failed to gather any momentum during the 
campaign because of unpopular provincial NDP governments in 
British Columbia and Ontario. Additionally, it has been 
argued by Alan Whitehorn that the party did poorly because 
it had to contend with right-wing populism (the Reform 
Party) not seen since the Social Credit Party during the 
early eighties.
Indeed, there are many factors which help to explain 
why the NDP performed so poorly in 1993. This chapter, 
however, will argue that there were two critical factors 
responsible for the NDP's poor showing in 1993. The first 
was the NDP's attempts to obtain the support of labour 
leaders and their respective organizations. Labour, after 
all, pressured the federal NDP to focus on the free trade 
issue in 1993 even though it was not a major concern of the
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voting public.(1) Second, the NDP's organizational 
structure also contributed to its electoral shortcomings in 
1993. The NDP's integrated structure meant that the Federal 
Party was burdened by the records of unpopular NDP 
governments in Ontario and British Columbia. In Ontario the 
impact of the Rae government's passage of its social 
contract legislation severely damaged NDP-labour relations 
at a time when the Federal Party needed labour's dollars, 
its organizational expertise, and its people.
Relying primarily on newspaper articles and data 
compiled from The 1993 Canadian Election Study, by David A. 
Northrup and Anne E. Oram, this chapter will show that the 
NDP's platform managed to turn away union and non-union 
voters alike in droves. As well, it is also important to 
review newspaper articles during the campaign period to 
illustrate what issues were being conveyed to the voters by 
the NDP. The 1993 Canadian Election Study, by Northrup and 
Oram, has been chosen because it includes three surveys 
which were conducted during the election campaign with a 
large sample size of 3,775 participants.(2) Additional 
literature, including The Canadian General Election of 1993, 
by Frizzell, Pammett and Westell, were also used in order 
fill any remaining gaps. Before discussing the 1993 
election, however, a brief account of the factors which have 
influenced voting behaviour in Canada will be presented as 
an important background for this chapter. To illustrate the
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uniqueness of voting behaviour in Canada, comparisons with 
culturally similar states will be presented as well.
Voting Behaviour
The factors which have influenced voting behaviour have 
been truly unique to Canada when compared to other liberal 
democratic states. Specifically, in most other countries 
social class has been a key determinant influencing voting 
behaviour.(3) Even when compared to other Anglo-American 
countries, which are culturally similar to Canada, social 
class plays a very marginal role in shaping voting behaviour 
in Canada.(4) Unlike Canada, in Great Britain and 
Australia, the British Labour Party (BLP) and the Australian 
Labour Party (ALP) are solidly linked to the working class 
segment of society. The BLP, however, has enjoyed the 
highest level of class voting. In Australia the party's 
deep historic roots have made it the party of choice not 
only of the working class, but of the middle class as well. 
As Robert Alford points out, "From the beginning of 
Australia as a nation in 1901, the Labor Party has existed 
as a political force and has therefore shaped the political
traditions of Australia "(5) Based upon a number of class
voting studies, Alford contends that amongst Anglo-American 
states, Great Britain has the highest level of class voting, 
followed by Australia in second place, the United States 
third, and Canada fourth.(6)
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There are many reasons why there has been a 
particularly low degree of class consciousness exhibited by 
Canadians. The first is that Canada's geographic size has 
traditionally meant that voting behaviour has often been 
determined by regional considerations. An Albertan, for 
example, employed in the oil industry would more likely be 
concerned over oil prices than a Newfoundlander earning a 
similar income employed in the fishing industry. Canadian 
political parties recognizing that regional diversity plays 
a key part in influencing voting behaviour have operated on 
brokerage principles. In other words, parties attempt to 
create a coalition of various interests during election 
time. Traditionally, although not exclusively, this has 
been reflected by the Liberal Party's success in Quebec and 
in many urban centres in Ontario, whereas the Conservatives 
have fared better in rural Ontario and the West. As for the 
NDP, it has enjoyed limited success in Western Canada, 
particularly in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. It is 
important to note that the federal NDP, despite all its 
efforts, has been unable to make significant gains in 
Central and Eastern Canada.
The second major determinant influencing voting 
behaviour in Canada has been ethnicity. Quebecers, for 
example, have tended to vote solidly for one party during 
federal elections. Since the time of Wilfrid Laurier up 
until the Trudeau era, Quebecers voted solidly for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
Liberal Party (1896 to 1984).(7) Suddenly, and quite 
dramatically, the Conservatives led by a Quebecer, Brian 
Mulroney, were able to win an overwhelming majority of 
Quebec seats in 1984. Mulroney's success in Quebec can be 
attributed to his alliance with many Quebec nationalists and 
specifically with his promise to amend the Constitution in a 
manner that would satisfy Quebec's constitutional demands.
In 1988, the Conservatives were able to repeat their strong 
showing, winning 60 of 72 seats in Quebec. However, the 
death of the Meech Lake Accord coupled with its unpopular 
successor, the Charlottetown Accord, drove many of the 
Conservatives' former Quebec allies away. Under the 
leadership of a former Mulroney Cabinet Minister, Lucien 
Bouchard, many Quebec nationalists created the Bloc 
Quebecois which went on to win 54 seats in the 1993 federal 
election. Incidently, the dramatic rise witnessed by the 
Conservatives in Quebec during the eighties was matched by 
the party's fall in the 1990s. The Tories won only one seat 
there in 1993.
In addition to regional and ethnic influences, voting 
behaviour in Canada has been influenced, to a lesser degree, 
by gender, age, religion, and between rural and urban 
populations.(8) Clearly, then, there are many determinants 
which influence voting behaviour other than social class.
As a result, the NDP has been unsuccessful in its attempts 
to attract the majority of so-called "ordinary” Canadians.
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Table 3.1 shows that during the 1988 federal election, most 
Canadians who considered themselves as working-class, voted 
for the Conservative Party rather than for the NDP. The 
table also shows that only 16.4 percent of those 
individuals who considered themselves as middle-class voted 
for the NDP, compared to 60.9 percent for the Conservatives. 
Similarly, table 3.2 shows that during the 1988 federal 
election, the NDP finished a distant third to both the 
Conservatives and the Liberals as the party of choice 
amongst Canadians with family incomes below 25,000.
Table 3.1
Subjective Social Class and Vote in the 1988 Federal 
Election






Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg and Ralph
Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government, 
sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994),
p.137.
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Table 3-2









Total 7.4% 29.8% 44.9% 17.9%
Liberal 32.0 27.6 26.8 26.3
PC 46.7 48.2 45.6 56.3
NDP 15.5 19.6 21.6 14.7
Other 5.8 4.6 6.0 2.7
Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H . Wagenberg and Ralph
Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government,
sixth edition (Canada : Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994) ,
p.137.
As discussed in chapter one , rank and fi3.e trade
unionists have not favoured the NDP over the Conservatives 
or the Liberals. In keeping with past trends, the NDP 
failed to attract the rank and file to vote for it during 
the 1988 election campaign. This happened despite the fact 
that the labour leadership had solidly backed the NDP during 
the campaign. As well, free trade, vehemently opposed by 
labour leaders, became the major issue of the 1988 election. 
Although the NDP did receive its highest level of support 
both in terms of popular vote and seats won (20.4% of the 
vote and 43 seats), more rank and file trade unionists voted 
Conservative or Liberal than they did for the NDP (Table 
3.3} .
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Table 3.3






NDP 24 .9 15-0
Other 4.8 5.5
Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg, and Ralph
Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government, 
sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994),
p.137.
Not surprisingly, then, the NDP was not the party of 
choice for the rank and file in 1993 as well. The 
difference, unfortunately for the NDP, was that with the 
entrance of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois, it was no 
longer the only viable alternative to the Conservatives and 
the Liberals. In other words, the NDP lost its monopoly, 
and consequently its image, as a protest party challenging 
the other two traditional parties. This would have major 
implications for the NDP in 1993, especially in the West 
where Reform became its most serious opponent.
Many academics, most notably Brodie and Jenson, have 
argued that the NDP has failed to secure working class 
support because it has not challenged the conventional 
definition of politics as defined by the Liberals and the 
Conservatives.(9) Consequently, this has meant that the 
politics of regionalism and ethnicity, rather than class,
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have continued to prevail in Canada. Brodie and Jenson’s 
assessment, however, is exaggerated. It assumes that a 
political party is capable of shaping the long-term values 
of a heterogenous and regionally diverse country. Even in 
many western European states, where there has been a much 
higher level of class consciousness, this has occurred 
because of Europe's feudal roots and the homogeneity of most 
European states. Lipset points out that: "Religious and
ethnic differences— have correlated with socioeconomic 
divisions, so that there has been an admixture of class and 
ethnic support.” (10) The absence of religious and 
aristocratic privilege combined with the notion that social 
mobility is possible has clearly inhibited the development 
of class awareness in Canada. In short, political parties 
reflect the views and values of society rather than vice 
versa. If they choose not to reflect or articulate clearly 
those views and values, they will not be as electorally 
successful as planned.
As for the federal NDP, the majority of its support and 
seats have traditionally come from the rural regions of 
Western Canada, rather than from industrial workers. Many 
of these people are self-employed farmers, not employees, 
and in many cases they are, in fact, employers. Hence, the 
NDP, unlike many other social democratic parties has been 
largely dependent on the petit bourgeois for its support. 
This explains, in part, why the party has never challenged
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private ownership or aroused class consciousness, preferring 
instead to focus on the redistribution of wealth within the 
capitalist system.
The fact that the NDP is made up of a coalition of 
various interests further restricts the party’s ability to 
formulate a coherent political platform. More often than 
not, these competing interests collide with one another- 
For example, the NDP has traditionally received support from 
labour and many environmental groups. Should the party then 
support further logging projects in environmentally 
sensitive areas which create jobs and steady employment for 
union workers? Or, should the NDP support the preservation 
of Canada's forests to appease the environmentalists? These 
difficulties are only further complicated for the federal 
NDP because it has to devise an electoral strategy which 
addresses the concerns, and sometimes conflicting interests, 
which vary from region to region. Unfortunately, this has 
meant that the NDP was seriously inhibited in its ability to 
devise new policies during the 1993 election campaign. The 
party appeared satisfied to fight "against" change, such as 
proposals to reduce the deficit, instead of proposing any 
policy alternatives of its own. In the past, by either 
fighting against Liberal and Conservative policies, or 
defending the status quo, the party had been able to hold on 
to its loose coalition of supporters. However, economic 
recession and rising government debt and deficits in the
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1990s made the NDP's calls for further spending on 
government programs increasingly unpopular among voters, 
including union members.
Although there is general agreement that the NDP must 
re-examine itself or face the possibility of political 
extinction, it appears that several key issues are being 
overlooked. The literature reviewed in chapter two shows 
that little has been said about reasons why rank and file 
trade unionists have not been voting for the NDP. Moreover, 
there is the inaccurate assumption that the political views 
of labour leaders are similar to the views of the rank and 
file. For example, Desmond Morton states that during the 
1993 election "Provincial public sector workers in 
particular, many of them strong supporters of the NDP in the 
past, did not want to hear about recessions, deficits, 
rising health care costs or public opinion."(11) Using the 
1993 Canadian Election Study, this chapter will show that 
Morton's assessment is incorrect. Furthermore, it will be 
argued that if the NDP hopes to rebuild, it must devise a 
strategy that also addresses the concerns of the rank and 
file rather than just labour leaders.
The 1993 Election Campaign
With respect to labour-party relations, the federal NDP 
had several obstacles to overcome in 1993. First, just 
prior to the election campaign, there was dissention within
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the party's caucus over its position toward the Rae 
government in Ontario. In the spring of 1993 Steven Langdon, 
MP for the Windsor riding of Essex-Windsor, criticized the 
Ontario NDP government's social contract legislation and Bob 
Rae's increasing concern over the province's deficit.(12) 
Langdon's criticism of Rae was not acceptable to Audrey 
McLaughlin and she stripped Langdon of his position as the 
party's finance critic for his statements. However, Langdon 
did secure the support of his own constituency's largest and 
most influential labour organization, the Canadian Auto 
Workers (CAW). The Langdon affair had a negative impact on 
overall NDP-labour relations. For many labour leaders, 
McLaughlin's failure to criticize the Rae government's 
social contract combined with her decision to strip Langdon 
of his duties as the party's finance critic only further 
complicated an already strained relationship between the 
party and labour.
Second, and more importantly, the federal party was 
prepared to follow labour's advice and focus on the issue of 
free trade. Clearly, table 3.4 shows that both union and 
non-union voters alike held negative views with regard to 
free trade.
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Source: The data comes from The 1993 Canadian Election Study
However, this issue was not considered very important to 
most of the electorate. In fact, when asked what the most 
important campaign issue was both union and non-union 
individuals responded that jobs (37% union, 30% non-union) 
were most important. Ranking second behind jobs amongst 
respondents was the deficit followed in third place by 
health care. Interestingly, of the 68 different issues
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identified by the respondents, the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) and NAFTA finished near the bottom of the list. Only
0.2 percent of union and 0.3 percent of all non-union 
respondents identified these two issues as being most 
important to them. Other studies, such as those found in 
The Canadian General Election of 1993, also show similar 
rankings as well.(13)
Obviously there was a clear division between labour 
leaders, who wanted free trade to be a major campaign issue, 
and the rank and file, who saw jobs, the deficit and health 
care as their greatest concerns. Rank and file trade 
unionists, after all, are also taxpayers, investors, and 
mortgage holders etc.. They, unlike their labour leaders, 
were concerned over a wide range of issues, all of which 
have an impact on their own financial situation. This 
separation between labour leaders and their members has 
always hurt the NDP electorally. In 1993, it devastated the 
party because it was no longer the only serious political 
alternative to the Liberals and the Conservatives.
With a political platform failing to address the key 
issues in the minds of most voters, the NDP stumbled through 
the 1993 election campaign. Consequently, press coverage 
for the party was also minimal and its popularity appeared 
stuck early into the campaign at around 10 percent. 
Unfortunately for the federal NDP, the Rae government in 
Ontario received a substantial amount of unfavourable press
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coverage. With the election campaign only one day old, the 
Toronto Star reported that Rae's offers to help McLaughlin 
"...makes some of McLaughlin's labor supporters cringe, in 
the wake of Rae's social contract cuts."(14) In the same 
article Sid Ryan, Ontario division President of CUPE was 
quoted as saying: "The best thing Rae could do for Audrey
is go up to his cottage and stay there for the duration of 
this election."(15) That same day, the Windsor Star 
reported that the Canadian Auto Workers intended to support 
the federal party despite its opposition to the Rae 
government. However, the paper also reported: "The big
question is whether the foot soldiers of the labor movement 
will be able to bring much commitment and enthusiasm to the 
task, after the general disillusionment with Ontario's NDP 
government."(16) Therefore, in the first days of the 
election campaign, the press coverage received by the NDP 
was based as much on party-labour conflict at the provincial 
level, as on party-labour unity at the federal level.
The media continued to focus their coverage on labour- 
party conflict while tying these reports together to the 
federal party's election campaign. On September 11, 1993 
the Toronto Star reported that Rae and McLaughlin agreed to 
fight against free trade.(17) However, in the same article 
McLaughlin's advice to Ontario unionists fighting Rae was 
that they "will have to sort it out with the Premier." 
McLaughlin’s reluctance to comment on the Ontario
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government's record only further discouraged union activists 
from helping the federal party.
During the second week of the campaign, the media 
continued to focus on how Rae's social contract with labour 
was having a negative impact on the federal party. The 
Windsor Star reported that Liz Barkley, head of the Ontario 
Secondary School Teachers' Federation, had indicated that 
there were fewer of her union activists helping the federal 
NDP in 1993 than in the past.(18) As well, the same article 
reported that Sid Ryan (Ontario head of CUPE) announced that 
his union would only donate money and personnel to 
individual NDP candidates rather than contributing funds 
directly to the federal party.
As for the campaign itself, the NDP continued to focus 
on the free trade issue. McLaughlin began stepping up her 
attacks on the Liberals because of Chretien's uncertain 
position on NAFTA.(19) Furthermore, the party's own 
television campaign ads focussed on free trade along with 
other issues such as health care and unemployment.
Moreover, the ads ended with an anti-Ottawa statement: 
"Ottawa hasn't got the message - Send it. Vote NDP." 
Unfortunately, since the NDP was now seen as one of the 
three traditional parties its commercial ads were pushing 
potential NDP voters to the Reform Party instead of to the 
NDP.(20)
With ineffective campaign ads and a party platform not
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addressing the key issues, support for the NDP continued to 
fall. By the third week of the campaign, CTV news reported 
that the NDP had the support of six percent of decided 
voters.(21) Faced with the possibility of falling below the 
12 seats required to maintain official party status in the 
House of Commons, the NDP began looking for other campaign 
issues. McLaughlin began spending more time discussing the 
party's $15 billion, five year infrastructure program and 
its $4 billion proposed child care program. However, unlike 
the Liberals, these new spending programs were not being 
matched with a commitment to cut government spending, an 
issue that had been the second most important of the 
campaign.
Although most labour leaders did not favour deficit 
reduction by way of spending cuts, most of the rank and file 
did support such cuts. Even when asked about specific 
issues such as welfare and unemployment insurance, union 
members responded almost exactly as did non-union people in 
the survey (Table 3.5). Table 3.5 shows that both groups 
(union and non-union) supported at least some spending cuts 
to some previously "untouchable" programs, welfare and 
unemployment insurance. However, when questioned about what 
would happen to the deficit with an NDP victory (45% union, 
46% non-union), most responded that the deficit would 
increase. By contrast, only a small percentage of 
respondents (12% union, 11% non-union) believed that the
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deficit would decrease under an NDP government.(22)
Table 3.5
CUT SPENDING > WELFARE
Union Non-union
A Lot 22% 21%
Some 48 47
Not At All 29 29
COT SPENDING > UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Union Non-union
A Lot 8% 10%
Some 46 45
Not At All 44 42
Source: The data comes from The 1993 Canadian Election
Study.
Not surprisingly, when those participating in the 
survey were asked which party they would support, the NDP 
finished in fifth spot (table 3.6). Obviously, the party's 
stance on NAFTA and health care may have been well-received 
by labour leaders and other interest groups. However, the 
rank and file continued to leave the NDP for the Liberals, 
the Reform Party, and the Bloc Quebecois. Since the Bloc 
ran candidates only in Quebec, the 12 percent union support 
received is in actual fact many times higher than that 
amount. For the NDP, however, the Reform Party's 10 percent 
support among the rank and file posed a far greater concern 
for it. The Reform Party was beginning to seriously 
challenge the NDP in all of the 19 seats that the party held
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in British Columbia. Similarly, Reform's presence in 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan began to threaten NDP incumbents 
in these provinces as well. Although the NDP has never 
obtained significant rank and file trade union support, its 
6 percent support among trade unionists (see table 3.6) was 
still only half of what the pro-NAFTA and generally 
unpopular Conservative Party received in the same survey.
Table 3.6








Source: The 1993 Canadian Election Study. Percentages do
not add up to 100 because those respondents undecided or 
refusing to answer are not listed.
By week four of the election campaign, the NDP appeared 
stuck at about 6 percent support.(23) Instead of trying to 
secure the 12 seats needed to retain official party status, 
the NDP continued to try to win some seats in Ontario. For 
example, at a rally in Windsor, Ontario, McLaughlin 
described Langdon as one of "the most effective MPs in 
Ottawa."(24) This despite the fact that McLaughlin had 
stripped Langdon of his duties as finance critic prior to 
the campaign. The party also began placing more attention
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on health care. The NDP's new political ads asked: "The
Liberals let you down on free trade. Will they let you down
on health care?"(25) The Toronto Star reported that
McLaughlin referred to the protection of medicare and other
social programs as the "fight of (her) life."(26)
McLaughlin's crusade, however, to save health care
stalled badly from the very beginning. With less than two
weeks remaining in the campaign, McLaughlin was seen
discussing the importance of preserving health care while at
one of the health centres facing a 4.4 percent cut in its
$20 million annual budget by the Rae government.(27) The
incident, well publicized by the media, further damaged the
NDP's credibility on yet another election issue.
Shawn Mendes's report, printed just days before the
election in the Globe & Mail, sums up best the
disillusionment felt by many New Democrats over the party's
electoral strategy. Referring to the NDP's political
platform he argues the following:
Policies such as these make federal NDP 
leader Audrey McLaughlin look like Alice 
in Wonderland - well intentioned, but 
also far from reality that Canadians cannot
take her, or her party, seriously The
New Democrats could have seized the deficit 
as their issue. Debt-servicing redistributes 
tax dollars from working taxpayers 
to wealthy bondholders, many of whom are 
offshore? fighting the deficit therefore 
would be an egalitarian cause.(28)
Certainly, had the NDP been committed to fighting the
deficit, it could have possibly stemmed the flow of many New
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Democrats switching over to Reform in Western Canada. After 
all, a few years earlier Roy Romanow became the NDP premier 
of Saskatchewan by promising to balance his province's 
budget. However, federal party strategists understood that 
a campaign centring on deficit reduction would have angered 
many of Ontario's labour leaders, who were still fighting 
Rae over the social contract. Thus, the federal NDP's 
attempt to gain the support of labour leaders not only 
failed to lead to electoral support, it also hurt the party 
in the West where the majority of its incumbents were 
fighting for their political lives.
On election night, October 25th 1993, the NDP finished 
with 6.9 percent of the vote and just nine seats.(29) In 
Ontario, the party failed to win a single seat after sending 
ten New Democrats to Ottawa in 1938. One blue-collar riding 
after another in Ontario fell to the Liberals on election 
night. The ridings of Nickel Belt, Sault Ste. Marie,
Thunder Bay - Atikokan and Timmins - Chapleau went 
decisively Liberal. In the working-class riding of Oshawa, 
more voters preferred the Reform Party than the NDP.(30) 
Interestingly, even Steven Langdon lost in his riding of 
Essex-Windsor. Langdon, the first New Democrat MP to 
publicly criticize Rae's social contract, had received solid 
labour backing from the powerful Canadian Auto Workers. 
Langdon's loyalty to his labour allies, however, did not 
prevent him from being defeated. In fact, his Liberal
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opponent defeated him by a margin of nearly two to one.(31) 
Certainly, Langdon's defeat illustrates that labour's 
dollars and campaign assistance alone could not have saved 
the NDP in Ontario.
Conclusion
During the 1993 election campaign the NDP's political 
platform offered little to interest the rank and file to 
vote for it. In the past, the NDP could have simply 
retained its core base of support by fighting for more 
social programs or condemning corporate profits. This, 
however, was no longer the case by 1993. Union and non­
union voters alike were fearful for their jobs and concerned 
about Canada's ballooning debt. Instead of listening to the 
concerns of the voter, the NDP preferred to devise an 
unimaginative and safe political strategy, so as not to 
offend its allies in the labour movement as well as other 
special interest groups. As a result, the NDP stumbled 
through the 1993 election campaign still opposing free 
trade, often defending the status quo, and promising even 
more costly government programs.
The NDP, obviously, believed that it would have been 
politically advantageous to forge ties with organized 
labour, ignoring the fact that labour leaders have 
historically failed to influence the voting behaviour of 
their members♦ On the other hand, public-sector unions and
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the CAW were less than enthusiastic in their support for the 
federal NDP. These unions openly questioned their support 
for the party during the 1993 election campaign. Although 
the private-sector unions continued to fully support the 
federal party, their size and strength could not make up the 
void left by the public-sector unions. The dismal electoral 
showing by the NDP in 1993 has finally forced the party and 
organized labour to seriously re-assess their relationship 
with one another.
Finally, it is obvious that the Federal Party was 
handicapped during the 1993 federal election because of its 
integrated structure. Financial contributions to the 
Federal Party were reduced because donations to the party's 
provincial wings had steadily declined as a result of the 
unpopularity of several provincial NDP governments. 
Additionally, party activists, including trade unionists and 
other NDP supporters, were shying away from the Federal 
Party because of its close organizational relationship with 
its unpopular provincial wings. Lastly, throughout the 
election, the Federal Party could not articulate its program 
because of the controversy it was forced to address 
surrounding the Rae government's social contract legislation 
in Ontario.
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NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS AFTER 1993 
CHAPTER FOUR
Since the 1993 federal election, New Democrats have 
been reevaluating their ties with organized labour. Labour, 
too, has been eager to redefine its place in politics. The 
divisions which exist within the labour movement and within 
the NDP, however, have only further complicated a very 
difficult renewal process. For example, private sector 
unions have continued to view the NDP as a valuable ally.
On the other hand, the CAW and the public-sector unions have 
sought alternative political strategies. As for the NDP, 
there are many who believe that the party’s ties with labour 
are outdated and detrimental. Still, there are others 
within the party who believe that the continuation of NDP- 
labour relations is vital for the party's long-term 
political survival.
When examining NDP-labour relations during the post- 
1993 period, it is first necessary to look at the records of 
Canada's provincial NDP governments. This is because the 
NDP is an integrated party, meaning that there is no clear 
separation between the party's federal and provincial wings. 
Moreover, because the majority of labour related legislation 
falls under provincial jurisdiction, it is often the 
legislative objectives of provincial NDP governments which 
have shaped NDP-labour relations. This also explains, in
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part, why labour has set up its own federations along 
provincial lines.
Based upon the performances of provincial NDP 
governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, 
it will be argued that it remains politically advantageous 
for labour to support the NDP. Moreover, this chapter will 
show that as long as the CAW and the public-sector unions 
continue to distance themselves from the NDP, they threaten 
to lose their ability to influence public policy. As for 
the NDP, it will be argued that it must pursue a political 
agenda which balances the interests of labour with the 
values and concerns of the majority of Canadians. To 
successfully accomplish this task, it will be argued that 
the NDP must make a number of structural changes. The 
structural changes proposed in this chapter include 
transforming the NDP into a confederal party, increasing 
labour's participation within the party, and allowing for 
the admission of cross-regional factions. Goldman's 
transaction theory, moreover, will be employed to help 
explain how these changes can enhance the effectiveness of 
NDP-labour relations in the future.
The Social Contract: The NDP-Labour relationship in Crisis
In the summer of 1994, the CAW announced that it was 
withdrawing its support for the NDP in Ontario.(1) The 
CAW's decision was in response to the Rae government's
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decision to pass the Social Contract Act (Bill 48). The 
social contract was criticized by both the CAW and the 
public sector unions because it legislated a unilateral 
roll-back of existing collective agreements.(2) More 
seriously, these unions felt betrayed by a government which 
they helped to elect in 1990. Reflecting this sense of 
betrayal, the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) argued that 
Rae’s social contract "ensured reassessment" of its 
relationship with the NDP.(3) Although there was a great 
deal of criticism expressed by labour over the social 
contract, not all labour organizations were as eager to 
criticize the Rae government. In fact, during both the 1993 
federal election and the 1995 Ontario provincial election, 
the majority of private sector unions continued to endorse 
the NDP-
The divisions which have existed within the labour 
movement, over the issue of whether or not to support the 
NDP, have had a significant impact on overall labour unity. 
The issue has caused rifts between union locals and their 
national councils, it has also caused serious divisions 
within the OFL, and it has similarly threatened the 
cohesiveness of the CLC. Within the labour movement two 
opposing camps have emerged. The first is comprised of 
Canada’s largest private sector union, the CAW, and the 
majority of public sector unions. The second is led by the 
Steelworkers and includes a number of other large labour
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organizations including the Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union of Canada, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union, and various other union 
organizations and union locals.(4)
In addition to viewing the social contract as an 
assault on existing public sector agreements, the CAW and 
the public sector unions believed that it placed the blame 
for Ontario's deficit on the backs of public sector workers. 
According to one CAW discussion paper "...the government 
soon began sounding like other governments, making 
judgements based on expediency, and putting the main focus 
on the deficit," and "The NDP was essentially teaching the 
most dangerous lesson of all: there is nothing we can
really do; the right is right."(5) In other words, the CAW 
accused the Rae government of accepting a neo-conservative 
notion that the size of government had to be reduced. In 
fact, however, the social contract was an attempt by the Rae 
government to save jobs, thereby preserving the size of the 
provincial bureaucracy.
Jim Stanford, an economist for the CAW has argued that 
government deficits and accumulated debt are major problems. 
However, he contends that it was a problem brought about by 
neo-conservative fiscal policy, not because of public sector 
wages.(6) He also points out that fighting the deficit on 
the backs of workers or by cutting social programs are 
meaningless and unacceptable. Instead, he contends, changes
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in neo-conservative fiscal policy must be made in order to 
reduce government deficits. The NDP's unwillingness to 
challenge the existing workings of the free-market economy 
has led Stanford to conclude that the party offers little 
more than "Neo-Liberalism Light".(7) Consequently, he has 
criticized NDP governments for their handling of the current 
economic crisis. Specifically, Stanford accuses provincial 
NDP governments of promising the same solutions as other 
pro-business governments. The only apparent difference, 
however, is that the NDP has presented itself as a party 
that could somehow implement spending cuts in a fairer and 
more humane manner.(8)
Stanford's explanation of why government deficits and 
debt have become such a large problem does have its merits. 
Indeed, pursuing fiscal policy which ensures high interest 
rates as a method to curb inflationary pressures leads to an 
increase in interest payments required to service government 
debt. As well, high interest rates reduce consumer demand 
for goods because the cost of borrowing money becomes too 
high in relation to inflation. The overall impact of 
reducing consumer demand to combat inflation has led to 
significant layoffs in those sectors which produce consumer 
goods. Unfortunately, this has also meant that many of the 
former taxpayers and consumers, now unemployed, become 
dependent on the state in order to survive. This increase 
in the demand for social assistance has only added another
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financial burden for governments to contend with.
Certainly, drastic changes in fiscal policy need to be 
made. However, because such fiscal changes can only occur 
at the federal level, it is unfair to condemn provincial NDP 
governments for a lack of action. During the 1995 Ontario 
provincial election, for example, Hargrove had been quoted 
as saying: "...the only way to reduce government debt 
effectively is to lower interest rates. High rates only 
help international i n v e s t o r s 9) Therefore, the CAW's 
criticism of the Rae government was seriously misguided 
because it condemned the government for not acting on issues 
which it, in fact, had no jurisdictional control over.
This leads to an important question: Even though the Rae
government's social contract undermined collective 
bargaining agreements, should the CAW and the public sector 
unions have withdrawn their support for the NDP in Ontario? 
Instead of abandoning the NDP, the CAW and public sector 
unions should have continued to support the NDP in public, 
while working behind closed doors to work out more 
acceptable public sector agreements. Such an alternative 
strategy would have had both short-term and long-term 
advantages.
In the short-term, continued support for the NDP could 
have helped the federal party during the 1993 election 
campaign. In 1988, for instance, the NDP received 24.9 
percent of the union vote. However, in 1993 the NDP
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received only 6 percent of the vote from unionized workers, 
a decline of 18.9 percent. As well, the federal NDP was 
constantly pressured by labour to respond and somehow 
resolve the controversial social contract issue. More 
seriously, during the 1995 Ontario provincial election, the 
CAW and the public sector unions' unwillingness to help the 
NDP only contributed to the election of a right-wing 
government which promised to make substantial cuts in the 
public sector.
In the long-term, continued support for the NDP could 
have led to the development of alternative economic 
strategies with which labour could have been directly 
involved. After all, it was the Rae government which passed 
Bill 40, considered by the labour movement as one of the 
most progressive pieces of labour legislation in North 
America.(10) Similarly, with labour as an ally, rather than 
a foe, it could have worked with the NDP to build and 
improve upon other pieces of legislation, such as pay equity 
and employment equity. Instead, the CAW and its public 
sector allies have chosen to work outside Canada's social 
democratic party.
In contrast, the private-sector unions, led by the 
Steelworkers, have chosen to remain supportive of the NDP. 
Unlike the public sector unions and the CAW, they favour 
working with the NDP to develop alternative economic 
strategies, including a reduced work week, co-ownership, and
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a greater say in training and management decisions.(11) 
Furthermore, among the private sector unions there is a 
general acceptance that tough budgetary decisions have to be 
made.(12) In response to the CAW and the public sector 
unions position towards the NDP, Leo Gerard has argued: 
"Surely there are more effective ways of responding to this 
crisis than with empty rhetoric and withdrawing of support 
for provincial NDP governments."(13) Clearly, the rift 
between the CAW-public sector unions, and the private sector 
unions cannot be underestimated. Interestingly, however, 
during the Ontario election campaign both the CAW and 
certain public sector unions softened their position when it 
became frighteningly clear that the Tories were poised to 
win the provincial election.
The 1995 Ontario Provincial Election
The defeat of the Ontario NDP government on June 8,
1995 provides important lessons for both the NDP and the 
labour movement. It illustrates that fighting with one 
another does nothing to advance the objectives of either 
side. The NDP clearly underestimated the impact that 
opening public sector agreements would have on party-labour 
relations. However, labour should have accepted the fact 
that the government's deficit had ballooned and immediate 
measures were necessary. Unfortunately, in November 1993 
the OFL, under tremendous pressure from the CAW and the
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public sector unions, demanded that the Rae government 
repeal Bill 48.(14) It also suggested that the labour 
movement develop alternative political strategies, including 
developing broad based social coalitions to influence all 
governments.(15) Behind the scenes, though, the OFL was 
deeply divided. More specifically, within the OFL the 
majority of private sector unions had supported an 
alternative resolution which would have endorsed the NDP 
despite the social contract.
Meanwhile, the tensions between the public sector 
unions and the NDP continued to mount. On the one hand, 
there were the public sector unions who felt betrayed by the 
Rae government. On the other hand, there was an 
inexperienced NDP government scrambling to deal with a 
recession that it had greatly underestimated. When the 
government announced that Ontarians would be going to the 
polls on June 8, 1995 labour was left in a difficult 
position: It could support the NDP in its bid to be re­
elected, or it could watch the party be defeated by 
political opponents committed to implementing deep budgetary 
cuts and massive layoffs in the public sector.
Almost immediately labour appeared to be softening its 
position with regard to the NDP. Although it never did 
officially endorse the party during the campaign, CAW 
president Buzz Hargrove was quoted as saying: "Bay Street
will be screaming— They will do everything they can to
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ensure the NDP’s defeat."(16) Moreover, OFL president 
Gordon Wilson announced that he was personally supporting 
the Rae government despite his federation's refusal to 
officially endorse the party.(17)
Interestingly, while many labour leaders were 
disappointed by the Rae government's performance, an 
Environics poll released on April 20, 1995 showed that most 
Ontarians thought that women’s groups, the poor, and labour 
unions had been the primary beneficiaries of the NDP 
government.(18) The same poll also showed that 56 percent 
of middle-class Ontarians strongly disagreed or disagreed 
that the Rae government represented them.(19) In addition, 
the poll showed that Ontarians wanted the government’s top 
priorities to be promoting economic growth (32%), reducing 
the provincial deficit (28%), and maintaining social and 
health programs (17%).(20) Obviously, while Rae's social 
contract isolated many of the NDP's traditional labour 
supporters, it was still seen by most Ontarians as a party 
which represented labour’s interests. Furthermore, the Rae 
government’s attempt to fight the deficit was seen as a 
half-hearted attempt to curb spending by those who wouldn’t 
have voted NDP anyway.
In addition to budgetary problems, the NDP had to 
contend with a sluggish economy. Those on the right blamed 
NDP programs and policies, such as the jobsOntario training 
program, employment equity, and the government’s anti-scab
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legislation for Ontario's poor economic performance.
Instead of directing its criticism towards federal fiscal 
policies, the disgruntled left chose to blame the Rae 
government. Consequently, attacks from both the left and 
the right only further reduced the Rae government's 
credibility insofar as being capable of managing the 
economy. To complicate matters further for the NDP, many 
labour leaders in the public sector, such as Sid Ryan, 
CUPE's Ontario president, warned during the election 
campaign: "If the NDP wins, I expect there will be a move
by labor to start a new party."(21) Private sector unions, 
however, continued to remain loyal to Rae. In fact, the 
party reported that it was 20 percent better financed from 
unions in 1995, than it had been in 1990.(22)
With less than three weeks remaining in the campaign, 
serious cracks began to emerge at the highest levels of the 
OFL. Julie Davis, OFL secretary-treasurer and former CUPE 
member announced that she intended to run against Gord 
Wilson for the federation's presidency.(23) Relations 
between the two had reportedly soured when Wilson announced 
his support for the Rae government. While labour remained 
divided, an Angus Reid Poll released May 27 placed the 
Tories in the lead with 39 percent support, the Liberals 
with 35 percent support, and the NDP with 21 percent 
support.(24) As it became increasingly clear that the 
Tories were poised to win the election, many union locals
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broke ranks with their national organizations. Moreover, 
even those unions which continued to oppose Rae began 
warning of unrest if the next government intended to repeal 
Bill 40 (labour legislation which banned the use of 
replacement workers and made it easier for workers to 
organize). With a week remaining in the campaign, a number 
of CAW locals were actively campaigning for the NDP. Gabe 
MacNally, vice-president for CAW local 199 in St.
Catharines, for example, referred to Hargrove's refusal to 
endorse the NDP in the following manner: "As a responsible
leader, I think there's no option but for him to come out 
and support the NDP in this campaign."(25) As well, despite 
Sid Ryan's threats to establish a labour party if the NDP 
was re-elected, John Murphy of CUPE local 1000 (at Ontario 
Hydro) announced that he was advising his members to vote 
NDP.(26) Moreover, the CLC's president Bob White also 
announced that he was endorsing the NDP. On election night, 
however, the Conservatives won a convincing majority 
government with a platform which promised massive layoffs in 
the public sector, drastic cuts in government spending, and 
lower taxes.
In response to the NDP's electoral defeat, Paul 
McKeague argues in his insightful article: "Solidarity will 
bloom once more as labor defends the poor, denounces 
injustice, chats catchy slogans against tax breaks for the 
rich and feels good about itself again."(27) He continues
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by adding: "Labor has never had such a sympathetic ear at
Queen's Park, but the Rae government's modest achievements 
fell far short of the socialist Valhalla that danced in the 
heads of many of its labor supporters."(28) Unfortunately, 
the decision by public sector union leaders to oppose Rae 
will have significant long-term implications for their 
members. For example, instead of unpaid days off and wage 
roll-backs, many public sector workers will receive their 
layoff notices. Instead of pay equity, women will continue 
to make less than their male counterparts. Instead of 
employment equity, visible minorities, women, the disabled 
and aboriginal peoples will once again have to compete in an 
environment that has traditionally discriminated against 
them. As well, many constituencies with large unionized 
populations no longer have access to MPPs sympathetic to 
labour issues. For example, the NDP lost three of its four 
seats in Hamilton and two of its three seats in Windsor. In 
Oshawa NDP incumbent Allan Pilkey lost his seat by a margin 
of nearly two to one to his Progressive Conservative 
opponent.(29)
A Formula For Success: The NDP in Saskatchewan
In the midst of a number of devastating electoral 
setbacks suffered by the NDP at the federal level and in 
Ontario, one NDP government continued to enjoy considerable 
success. On June 21, 1995 the Saskatchewan NDP government,
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led by Premier Roy Romanow, won its second straight majority 
government. Roy Romanow1s success can be traced to his 
government's determination to get the province's spending 
under control. In fact, Romanow’s government was the first 
in Canada to balance its budget in the 1990s.(30) Indeed, 
some controversial decisions had to be made. The government 
not only increased taxes, it also cut spending by 
eliminating many rural hospitals. During the 1995 election 
campaign, Romanow made no apologies for his government's 
commitment to deficit fighting: "I have no time for
somebody who says that the debt is all a fiction."(31) 
Romanow's commitment to cut spending was extremely 
successful. The province's deficit went from $840 million 
in 1991 to a budget surplus of $119 million in 1995.(32)
The NDP's success in Saskatchewan paralleled closely 
the demise of the Rae government in Ontario. Why had 
Romanow triumphed while Rae had failed? First, Romanow had 
promised during the 1991 election campaign to balance the 
province's budget. By contrast, Rae promised to stimulate a 
sluggish Ontario economy by increasing government spending. 
Unfortunately for Rae, his government's deficit spending 
failed to lift Ontario's economy out of the recession. As a 
result, his party's critics were quick to attack the NDP as 
fiscally incompetent. Nevertheless, the mandates of the two 
governments were very different. However, while Rae backed 
down from many of his promises, Romanow did not deviate from
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his. Consequently, Rae's government lacked the credibility 
enjoyed by Romanow's government.
The Romanow government also continued to receive strong 
labour backing. Some critics have even accused the Romanow 
government of favouring unionized contractors for government 
contracts even if it had meant paying a higher price.(33) 
Moreover, unlike the NDP government in Ontario, 
Saskatchewan's NDP government enjoys strong grass-roots 
support built up over many years when the party has held 
power. In fact, the province elected the country's first 
CCF government in 1944, and since that time has dominated 
Saskatchewan politics. In Ontario, however, the NDP had to 
contend with a hostile and powerful business community which 
blamed it for the province's economic problems and 
skyrocketing debt.
NDP-Labour Relations: British Columbia
In British Columbia, the NDP has maintained good 
relations with labour. Although opinion polls in 1995 
placed Premier Mike Harcourt's government in third place, 
this was largely due to the numerous scandals which have 
plagued his government.(34) The Harcourt government has 
passed numerous pieces of pro-labour legislation, including 
most recently in 1995 the Employment Standards Act. This 
Act includes a number of guidelines that employers must 
follow in the workplace. For example, employers are
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required to register employees working in private residences 
to ensure that the minimum standards of the Act are 
enforced.(35) As well, the Act guarantees rest and meal 
breaks for employees working more than five hours in any 
given day.(36)
In addition to the Employment Standards Act, the 
Harcourt government has also raised the province’s minimum 
wage. As a result, it continues to receive support from the 
B.C. Federation of Labour, as well as from the public sector 
unions.(37) The B.C. Government and Service Employees Union 
(BCGEU), for example, remains a staunch supporter of the 
Harcourt government.
Why did British Columbia's NDP government continue to 
receive backing from the province’s public sector unions?
The most obvious answer is that the Harcourt government did 
not unilaterally open existing collective agreements of 
public sector workers. Beneath the surface, however, there 
is another explanation. There are in fact clear ideological 
differences between British Columbia's public sector unions 
and their counterparts in Ontario. During a CBC interview 
in May 1995, John Shields, president of the B.C. Government 
and Service Employees Union, argued that labour should 
continue to support the NDP despite the social contract.(38) 
He also described the divisions between labour and the NDP 
as "sad” and urged those unions opposing the NDP to 
cooperate with the party.(39) Interestingly, during the
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same interview, Shields warned that when BC's unions went 
against Dave Barrett's NDP government the result was that 
they indirectly helped to elect a "severe" right-wing 
government.(40) When Mike Darnell from CAW Local 444 in 
Windsor pointed out that his union was not providing money 
to the Ontario NDP, Shields responded by asking Darnell, 
"What other instrument in parliament do you have to push the 
trade union agenda?"(41)
Clearly, British Columbia's public sector unions share 
a view similar to Ontario's private sector unions with 
regard to NDP-labour relations. First, they both recognize 
that labour's interests cannot be better served by the NDP's 
political opponents. Second, they do not see how diverting 
money away from the NDP towards extra-parliamentary 
coalitions instead can help labour's interests. Third, and 
finally, both recognize that fighting the NDP, even if it 
means indirectly helping to elect right-wing governments, is 
highly detrimental to labour's interests.
The Future of NDP-Labour Relations
Although there are many obstacles which need to be 
overcome, rehabilitating NDP-labour relations must be a top 
priority for both the party and the labour movement. 
Certainly, the conditions for better relations exist. The 
federal Liberals* fiscal and monetary policies have proven 
to be little different than their predecessors, as far as
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labour is concerned. The separatist Bloc Quebecois is the 
official opposition in Canada, and Parliament's third 
largest party is more right-wing than the governing party.
In Ontario, the Rae government was defeated by a pro­
business government committed to repealing some of what 
labour would consider as the country's most progressive 
legislation. Additionally, the new government in Ontario 
has already begun a process of slashing government spending 
for welfare and subsidized housing, which many union leaders 
could only describe as unacceptable.
Before improved relations between the NDP and the 
labour movement can be realized, however, labour must first 
overcome its internal divisions. A labour movement divided 
can do little to advance the interests of its members. 
Canada's largest private sector union, the CAW, and its 
public sector allies should not abandon the NDP. Although 
both the CAW and the public sector unions have already 
committed themselves to participating in extra-parliamentary 
social coalitions, this approach without continued support 
for the NDP will reap few benefits.
As for the NDP, the debate over labour's value as an 
ally has been hotly contested at the party's renewal 
conferences. In an article submitted at the NDP's December 
1994 renewal conference, John Richards argues the following: 
"It is simply not credible that a social democratic party 
present itself as efficient managers of a generous welfare
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state, and as the political agent of public sector 
unions.” (42) He also contends that in the long run, 
breaking ties with labour "...would benefit the NDP and 
unions, at least private sector unions."(43) Richards 
argument, however, is flawed because it assumes that deficit 
fighting equals cutting public sector workers, a sentiment 
which is not shared by all New Democrats.
Ottawa MP Nelson Riis, for example, contends that 
although the debt and the deficit is a problem, it is 
symptom of a deeper problem, that being high 
unemployment.(44) Riis argues that while the NDP should 
commit itself to balancing the budget, it should do so 
lowering interest rates and focusing on job creation. He 
hopes that the party will continue to cooperate with labour. 
However, he believes that the party has to change in
changing times and hopes that " labour also changes to
reflect these realities."(45)
When asked why the NDP did so poorly in 1993, Ottawa MP 
Chris Axworthy blamed the party's "out of date, old 
fashioned vision" for the NDP's failures.(4 6) He argues 
that the party had not been in touch with its constituents, 
preferring instead to fight battles (free trade) already 
lost.(47) More importantly, he correctly points out that 
trade unionists do not vote as trade unionists.
Consequently, Axworthy believes a political platform which 
appeals to the rank and file will in the long-run strengthen
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NDP-labour relations. When asked whether he supports a
deficit fighting strategy Axworthy responded:
In my mind there is nothing more left- 
wing than to deal with the deficit. It 
takes money from the poor to the rich...
[it] prevents a government and a society 
from using its resources for public good 
and it gives money to foreign bond-holders.(48)
Unlike Nelson Riis, Axworthy insists that if the public
sector is overmanned, then he would favour public sector
cuts. However, Axworthy points out that such cuts should
be made at the upper management levels first (ie. non-union
positions).
The way in which NDP-labour relations will evolve 
ultimately depends on whether or not the two sides share 
compatible goals. Although the CAW has been an outspoken 
critic of the NDP, there is evidence which suggests that the 
two sides are not very far apart. For example, the CAW has 
outlined a number of social reform objectives:
What Social Reform Should Be...
1) Right to a decent job;
2) Transitional support in the form of income and 
education/training during temporary unemployment;
3) The removal of barriers to work and training faced by 
any group (discrimination, disabilities, part-time 
work, childcare);
4) Adequate income maintenance for those not in the 
workforce (pensions, single mothers, children, injured 
workers);
5) Universal services (health, education, childcare).(49)
The goals outlined above are, in fact, not much different 
than the objectives outlined at the NDP's renewal
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conferences.
During the NDP's December 1994 renewal conference, the 
party's mission panel agreed that its goals were to create a 
society dedicated to equality, justice and democracy.(50)
The panel also agreed that the party's overriding concern 
was to represent workers and the disadvantaged.(51) 
Interestingly, the NDP's mission panel also expressed a 
willingness to participate in extra-parliamentary social 
coalitions, a strategy already utilized by the CAW and the 
public sector unions. Specifically, the mission panel 
states that the party must "work with the widest possible 
range of organizations, including the labour, feminist and 
environmental movements, with whom we have something in 
common philosophically— "(52) Clearly, then, the obstacles 
which have plagued NDP-labour relations in recent years can 
be resolved. Both labour and the party share a common 
belief in helping working people and the disadvantaged in 
order to create a more egalitarian society. The real test, 
though, will be whether or not both sides can agree on how 
to achieve their common goals.
To facilitate a reconciliation between labour and the 
NDP, structural reform of the party is required. Since the 
1930s, CCF-NDP relations with labour have often been 
tentative and precarious. This is because the NDP's 
structure makes it difficult for profitable exchanges to 
occur between labour and the NDP. According to Goldman's
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transaction theory, contributions toward an organization are 
made with the expectation of receiving something in return. 
Obviously, when the contributor doesn't receive any reward 
in return the probability of future transactions between the 
parties diminishes. As well, a lack of trust begins to 
develop by the disgruntled contributor, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of conflict. For example, when the NDP 
government in Ontario passed the Social Contract Act, the 
CAW and many public sector unions described the government's 
decision as an act of betrayal. As a result, many labour 
organizations not only cut their campaign donations to the 
federal party in 1993, they also refused to support the NDP 
in Ontario in 1995. Therefore, a new relationship which 
fosters trust and encourages profitable transactions between 
the NDP and labour must be created.
As discussed in the introduction of this study, there 
are three types of political transactions which can occur 
between two or more parties . First, shares (decisional 
elements) which refer to an individual's influence within 
the decision making process of the group. Second, 
incumbencies (positional elements) used to describe 
contributions which are made with the expectation of 
personal reward. Third, commodities (materiel elements) 
which characterizes the exchange of materials (ie. money) as 
am instrument for achieving an individual's goals.
According to Goldman's transaction theory, when profitable
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transactions occur cooperation and trust between parties are 
enhanced. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, aims to 
construct a new structural model for the NDP which, amongst 
other things, encourages profitable transactions between it 
and labour to occur.
Throughout this study the NDP has been described as an 
integrated party because, with the exception of Quebec, 
there is no clear distinction between its provincial and 
federal wings. The NDP is also a mass party. The major aim 
of a mass party is to have a large and active 
membership.(53) Canada's two traditional parties, by 
contrast, have been described as confederal in structure.
In other words, the provincial wings operate separately from 
the federal party. Canada's two traditional parties are 
also defined as cadre parties. Unlike mass parties , cadre 
parties do not require their members to belong exclusively 
to their party. Moreover, the very concept of membership in 
a cadre party is informal and important only for electoral 
mobilization.(54) Whereas the organizational structure of 
the traditional parties have led to success, the NDP's 
organizational structure has been one of the party's main 
weaknesses.
For the federal NDP, its integrated structure has meant 
that it has often been criticized for the conduct of 
provincial NDP governments. For example, during the 1993 
federal election campaign, various labour organizations
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announced that they were cutting their financial 
contributions to the federal party because of the Social 
Contract Act passed by the NDP government in Ontario. The 
confederal structure of the Liberals and the Conservatives, 
however, have spared them, to a large extent, from this 
problem. Under the leadership of Robert Bourassa, for 
instance, the Liberal Party of Quebec won two consecutive 
majority governments even though the federal Liberals fared 
poorly in Quebec during the same period. In Manitoba, Gary 
Filmon's Conservative Party was able to win its first 
majority government despite the unpopularity of the 
Conservative government in Ottawa.
The integrated model has also made it extremely 
difficult for the federal NDP to communicate with labour and 
other social coalition groups. Originally the party's 
founders believed that the integrated model would ensure 
that the NDP would be a centralized party. However, as 
Canada's provincial bureaucracies grew to accommodate the 
growing numbers of new government programs, provincial 
governments and the parties which formed them grew 
substantially. Consequently, the formation of NDP 
governments in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Manitoba and 
Ontario shifted power and prestige from the federal party to 
its provincial wings. For the NDP, then, the decentralizing 
pressures of Canadian federalism have made it increasingly 
difficult for the NDP to function as an integrated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
party.(55) Furthermore, because the party's membership 
lists are in the hands of its provincial wings, the federal 
NDP does not even know who its members are. In short, the 
federal NDP has lost direct access to its members within the 
labour movement, its constituency associations, and other 
social coalition groups.
The process of delegate selection for its conventions 
has also strengthened the NDP's provincial wings at the 
expense of the federal party. The majority of convention 
delegates come from constituency associations that, with the 
exception of Quebec, are shared with the provincial 
party.(56) Thus the voting behaviour of convention 
delegates, whether it is choosing a leader or changing the 
party's program, is often determined by provincial 
loyalties. As well, the NDP's Federal Council, which is 
responsible for governing the party between conventions, is 
dominated by provincial party table officers and members 
selected from provincial party conventions.(57)
Additionally, although affiliated unions usually comprise 
approximately 20 percent of convention delegates, their 
representation on Federal Council is only 10-12 percent.(58)
The NDP's organizational structure has also made it 
difficult for the federal party to formulate and articulate 
a coherent political program. Political differences between 
the NDP's provincial wings are reflective of the regional 
and economic diversity of Canada. The political dynamics of
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Saskatchewan, for instance, are different than those of 
Ontario. According to Terry Morley: "The ambivalent
language of convention resolutions reflected the ambiguous 
and diverse impulses among New Democrats."(59) Furthermore, 
as discussed in chapter two, the party's Strategy and 
Election Planning Committee (SEPC) had swelled to an 
unmanageable number of 50 members by 1993. Its size 
rendered the SEPC ineffective because it was difficult to 
please everyone on the committee. Instead of cooperation 
there was serious infighting and confusion amongst SEPC 
members. For example, when the NDP's communications officer 
Michael Balagus and SEPC chair Julie Davis had NDP campaign 
plans printed in the Ottawa Citizen the CLC's Carol Phillips 
wrote to Balagus, "Give me a break. We must've been at 
different meetings..."(60) Therefore, it is obvious how 
the rules and methods used to formulate its policies 
dramatically reduced the NDP's ability create a credible 
political platform in 1993.
What structural changes should the NDP implement? The 
answer to this question may be found, in part, by examining 
other social democratic parties. The electorally successful 
ALP, for example, may offer some answers. Similarly to the 
NDP, the ALP has historically been frustrated by 
federalism.(61) However, unlike the NDP, the ALP has made 
two key structural changes. First, during the 1980s the 
national ALP steadily separated itself from its state
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branches, and second, the ALP established a new method for 
organizing delegates based upon cross state factional 
alliances.(62) The newly legitimized factions were allowed 
to have their own rules for membership, their own 
constitutions and their own fee structures within the 
ALP.(63) By permitting factions into the party , the ALP 
has in effect created a party which encourages discussion 
between various groups and has shifted the very nature of 
intra-party debate from regional based concerns to cross 
state matters. Howard Pawley, moreover, points out that 
Australia’s trade unions participate in either right or left 
factions.(64) For the NDP, allowing labour organizations 
to participate in various factions would be extremely 
valuable. It would finally recognize the fact that labour is 
not a monolithic entity nor do labour leaders and their rank 
and file members share the same political views.
Allowing factions into the NDP would also recognize the 
fact that labour’s role within the party is that of both a 
partner and an interest group. This is because factions 
would be permitted to have their own conventions and their 
own constitutions while also holding membership with the 
NDP. As well, factional representatives would be permitted 
to attend party conventions and participate in the NDP's 
major decision-making bodies. In other words, the relative 
autonomy afforded to the factions would allow labour 
representatives to voice their concerns freely and without
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fear of expulsion from the party.
Before suggesting, however, that the NDP should model 
itself after the ALP, it is important to note that there are 
problems associated with factionalism as it exists within 
the ALP. The pre-selection of party candidates, for 
instance, has become increasingly dominated by factional 
considerations, rather than determined by the qualifications 
of the candidates .(65) As well, there has been a certain 
degree of resentment over the role played by the factions 
amongst party members who are not involved in factions.(66) 
Finally, when in government the ALP's Cabinet selection 
process has been mainly determined by factional 
representation within the party's caucus. Therefore, while 
the admission of factions into the NDP should be considered, 
safeguards must also be made in order to prevent factional 
domination. Representation at NDP conventions and on 
Federal Council, for example, would be pre-set to ensure the 
numerical supremacy of delegates chosen from the party’s 
constituency associations. In the future, maintaining the 
representational supremacy of the constituency associations 
is essential if the NDP hopes to balance the interests of 
its grass roots supporters with the interests of labour and 
other groups.
Although NDP constituency associations would continue 
to enjoy representational supremacy, their role within the 
decision-making process would be reformed. Historically it
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has been the constituency association which has formulated 
resolutions which were intended to be debated at party 
conventions. Unfortunately, this has meant that NDP 
conventions have traditionally been flooded with a wide 
array, and sometimes conflicting, set of proposals. This, 
in turn, has made difficult for the party’s Resolutions 
Committee to decide which proposals are to be considered and 
which proposals are discarded. This process, then, has not 
only angered those constituency associations which have seen 
their resolutions abandoned, it has also made it difficult 
for the NDP to devise a coherent political program.
The NDP must therefore change the rules which have 
dictated how party policy is developed. Instead of allowing 
various local ridings the authority to devise and present 
resolutions, the NDP could create a few large regional 
policy making bodies divided in the following manner: 1)
Western region (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British 
Columbia); Central Region (Ontario and Quebec); and 3) 
Eastern Region (including all the Maritime provinces). one 
elected member from each constituency association would be 
part of these regional bodies. The duty of these members 
would be to formulate a limited (5 minimum/10 maximum) 
number of policy proposals which would then be voted by 
their respective constituency associations. Only those 
resolutions accepted by the constituency associations would 
be presented to the SEPC at the party's convention. The
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SEPC would then be required to develop a political platform 
for the party.
The SEPC, for its part, would be dramatically reduced 
in size. Representation on the SEPC would include the 
party's leader, its president, one member from each regional 
decision making body (total - 3), two factional 
representatives and 2 representatives from affiliated union 
locals. Although required to devise a political platform 
from the resolutions passed by the regional policy making 
bodies, the SEPC would also be permitted to develop its own 
policies. Moreover, elections would be held yearly for all 
SEPC members, except for the party's leader, and its 
president, to ensure a sufficient degree of accountability.
Obviously, then, there are many ways in which NDP- 
labour relations can be improved in fashion which would also 
help the NDP's electoral competitiveness. First, the NDP 
should become a confederal party. An independent federal 
party equipped with its own constituency associations would 
ensure that its members' loyalties lay exclusively with it. 
Labour organizations as well as their members would, for the 
first time, have direct access to the federal party. As 
well, labour organizations would also have the option of 
either joining as an affiliated union or within a recognized 
faction. The introduction of factions would minimize intra­
party conflict on the basis of regional allegiances while 
creating an atmosphere which encourages open debate.
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Why would labour unions join this new federal party? 
They would join because some of the void left by provincial 
wing delegates would be filled by labour delegates thereby 
giving it a greater voice within the federal party. 
Specifically, union representation on the Federal Council 
(10-12 percent under the party's present structure) would be 
raised in accordance with the number of union delegates 
participating at NDP conventions (currently 20-25 percent). 
Labour organizations which choose to join a faction with 
other individuals and coalition groups would also have 
representation on Federal Council and delegate 
representation at party conventions. By increasing labour's 
presence in the decision making process, the probability for 
profitable exchanges to occur between the NDP and labour 
would increase greatly.
By implementing all of these proposed structural 
changes the NDP will not only have a larger coalition of 
supporters, it will also have a larger and loyal grass roots 
following. The federal NDP will then be able to formulate a 
credible and electorally competitive political platform 
which balances the interests of labour with other groups and 
individuals.
Conclusion
Since the 1993 federal election campaign, NDP-labour 
relations have been precarious. The CAW and most public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5 2
sector unions have sought alternatives to the NDP, as a way 
to better serve labour's interests. By contrast, private 
sector unions have remained loyal to the NDP. Within the 
NDP there are also divisions with regard to labour's worth 
as a political ally. Although it is difficult to speculate 
how the NDP-labour relationship will unfold, it is clear 
that neither side has little to gain from a divorce.
The NDP remains as the only political party which 
represents labour's interests. Even in Ontario, where the 
public sector unions and the CAW refused to endorse the 
party, the Rae government passed Bill 40, employment equity, 
and pay equity. Similarly, in British Columbia, the 
Harcourt government implemented numerous pro-labour 
measures. In Saskatchewan, Romanow's NDP government 
successfully balanced the province's budget without the 
massive public sector layoffs or deep cuts in social 
services which occurred in neighbouring Alberta.
Ultimately, it will be up to the CAW and most of the 
public sector unions currently disillusioned by the NDP to 
make a number of important decisions. They must decide 
whether or not they are prepared to better reflect the 
political views of their members. Moreover, they will have 
to decide whether or not participating in extra- 
par liamentary social coalitions will better serve their 
interests than by aligning themselves with the NDP-
As for the NDP, it must restructure itself in a manner
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which conforms to the realities of Canadian federalism. The 
NDP must also allow for factions to exist within it. As 
well, increased union representation on Federal Council 
should reflect union representation on the convention floor. 
Enhanced labour participation at all levels of the federal 
party would encourage profitable transactions and 
consequently greater NDP-labour cooperation. If the NDP' 
follows this direction it can emerge as a significant 
political force more capable of challenging the country's 
other major parties.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION
The previous chapters have clearly shown that the 
tensions between che NDP and labour have been detrimental to 
the interests of both organizations. It has also been 
concluded that in order to improve its electoral fortunes, 
as well as its relationship with labour, the NDP must be 
willing to implement a number of structural changes. Prior 
to discussing these proposed structural changes, a brief 
reiteration of the key factors which have shaped NDP-labour 
relations in the 1990s is necessary.
NDP-Labour Relations: 1990-1995
In 1989, the NDP chose Audrey McLaughlin as its leader. 
Although McLaughlin had limited political experience, her 
commitment to social policy issues pleased many labour 
leaders. In fact, during the leadership convention 
McLaughlin was supported by some of the largest and most 
influential labour leaders including, Leo Gerard of the 
Steelworkers, Bob White from the CAW (now president of the 
CLC), CUPE's president Jeff Rose, and Gordon Wilson from the 
OFL.(1) With McLaughlin as the federal party's leader it 
appeared as though NDP-labour relations were about to enter 
into a new and more productive era.
The relationship between the NDP and labour, however, 
soured in 1993 because of the actions taken by Ontario’s NDP 
government. The Rae government in Ontario had grossly
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underestimated the recession of the early 1990s. The 
Ontario government, faced with shrinking revenues, soon 
found itself plagued with massive budgetary deficits and a 
skyrocketing debt. Ontario's fiscal situation became so 
serious that the government decided to negotiate a social 
contract with public sector unions in an attempt to control 
spending. After failing to reach an agreement with public 
sector union leaders, the Rae government legislated a 
unilateral roll-back of existing collective agreements. In 
response, public sector union leaders, along with the 
country's largest private sector union, the CAW, condemned 
the social contract because it infringed on collective 
bargaining rights. The fact that this legislation was 
passed by the NDP made it only more difficult for many 
labour leaders to comprehend because many trade unionists 
felt betrayed by an NDP government which they had helped to 
elect in 1990.
Unfortunately for the federal NDP, the rift between 
the labour and the Rae government unfolded during a federal 
election year. Indeed, the majority of Canada's labour 
organizations supported the federal party. However, 
labour’s support for the NDP in 1993 lacked the enthusiasm 
and the dollars associated with past federal election 
campaigns. This is because as an integrated party the 
majority of the Federal Party's campaign staff, including 
campaign advisors, came from its provincial wings. As a
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result, many of Ontario's labour organizations found it 
difficult to enthusiastically support the federal NDP 
because of the actions taken by one of its provincial wings. 
Furthermore, the Federal Party's apparent reluctance to 
speak out against Rae's social contract further dismayed the 
NDP's labour allies. In fact, when New Democrat MP Steven 
Langdon decided to publicly condemn the social contract, he 
was subsequently stripped of his duties as the party's 
finance critic for his comments.
On election night, October 25th 1993, the NDP received 
a mere 6.9 percent of the popular vote and only nine seats. 
In Ontario, the party lost all ten of the seats that it had 
won in 1988. In the West, moreover, the Reform Party 
successfully defeated many of the NDP's incumbents. The 
serious decline of the NDP has forced the party and its 
traditional labour allies to re-examine their relationship 
with one another. This study has attempted to identify the 
problems which have caused NDP-labour relations. As well, 
this study has presented possible solutions to these 
problems which would, in effect, increase labour's role 
within the NDP.
NDP-Labour Relations: A New Partnership
Establishing an alternative set of rules which enhances 
the effectiveness of NDP-labour relations requires 
structural change. In accordance with Goldman's transaction
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theory, it was concluded that an environment which 
encourages profitable transactions between labour and the 
NDP must be created. In order to create an environment 
which encourages profitable transactions to occur labour's 
participation in the decision making process of the NDP must 
be increased. It was argued that the labour's 
representation on the Federal Council be increased to 
reflect the number of labour delegates which attend the 
party's conventions. More importantly, it was argued that 
labour's presence be increased within a smaller, and more 
powerful, Strategy and Election Planning Committee.
Furthermore, the NDP would have to become a confederal 
party. This would enable the party, for the first time, to 
have a direct link with labour and its other supporters. 
Moreover, by becoming a confederal party, the NDP would have 
its own federal constituency associations and access to 
membership lists. More importantly, by having its own 
constituency associations, the federal NDP would have a 
membership loyal to it, rather than a membership which is 
divided by provincial loyalties.
As a confederal party, the NDP would be financially 
independent from its provincial wings. With its own 
membership lists it could solicit its supporters directly 
for funds. Moreover, for the first time, the Federal Party 
could fully benefit from the rules of the Elections Expenses 
Act, which allows federal parties to issue tax exemption
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receipts for political donations.
Finally, the NDP should also allow for factions to be 
admitted into the party. Allowing factions into the NDP, 
would encourage open debate on important and sometimes 
controversial issues. It would also allow another avenue 
for social coalition groups and labour organizations to 
participate in the NDP. In short, the removal of the 
provincial presence, combined with the admission of factions 
into the NDP, would encourage and enhance the party's 
ability to formulate a credible national program.
Clearly, then, the proposed structural changes are 
intended to maximize the potential benefits associated with 
NDP-labour ties. More significantly, the proposals attempt 
to accomplish this objective in a manner which will also 
improve the NDP's electoral chances.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
ENDNOTES
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(Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1992), p.66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 5
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alford, Robert R., "Class Voting in Anglo-American Political 
Systems," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (EDS.), 
Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National
Perspectives (New York: Collier - MacMillan Ltd.,1969).
Archer, Keith, Political Choices and Electoral Consequences: 
A Study of Organized Labour and the New Democratic Party 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen1s University
Press, 1990).
Brodie, Janine M. and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and 
Change: Party and Class in Canada (Toronto: Methuen,
1980).
Brooks, Stephen, Canadian Democracy: An Introduction
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993).
Cains, John, "Factions in the ALP," 1995.
Cameron, Duncan, Canadian Forum, October 1994.
Campbell, Robert M., and Leslie A. Pal, The Real Worlds of 
Canadian Politics, second edition (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press Ltd., 1991).
Caplan, Gerald, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF
in Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973).
Canadian Auto Workers, Labour and Politics: Rethinking, 
Redefining, Rebuilding,, submitted to the 4th 
Constitutional Convention of the CAW, August, 23-26, 
1994.
Canadian Auto Workers, Social Reform Or Social
Destruction? Expanding the Meaning of Citizenship, 
submitted to the 4th Constitutional Convention of the 
CAW, August 23-26, 1994.
Canadian Auto Workers, Where Are the Changes in Our Union 
Taking Us?, submitted to the 4th Constitutional 
Convention of the CAW, August 23-26, 1994.
CCF Papers, National Council and National Executive 1932- 
1960, MG 28 IV, vol. 5.
CCF Papers, National Council and National Executive 1932- 
1960,.MG 28 IV, vol. 8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
CCF Papers, National Conventions and Inter-Provincial 
Conferences, 1932-1960 (MG 28, IV, 1, vol.13), 1944 
Convention - Clippings.
Canadian Press, "1995 Election," Toronto Star, Saturday,
June 9, 1995-
Carty, R.K., "The Federal Face of Canadian Party
Membership,"in Campbell Sharman (ed.), Parties and 
Federalism in Australia and Canada (Canberra:
Federalism Research Centre, Australian National 
University, 1994).
CBC Newsworld, Face Off, Monday, May 1, 1995.
Cross, Michael S., The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea:
CCF-NDP Manifestoes 1932 to 1969 (Toronto: New Hogtown
Press, 1974).
Dewar, Marion, "Restructuring of the New Democratic Party of 
Canada," submitted to the NDP renewal conference, 
December 3-4, 1994.
Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties: Their Organization
And Activity in the Modern Society (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1966).
Eldersveld, Samuel J., Political Parties: A Behavioral
Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964).
Freeman, Richard B. and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 
(New York: Basic Books, 1984).
Frizzel, Alan, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell (eds.),
The Canadian General Election of 1993 (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1994).
Gerard, Leo W. "Redistributing Power in a Changing Economy: 
Defining a More Modern Militancy," in Steven Langdcn and 
Victoria cross (EDS.), As We Come Marching: People,
Power and Progressive Politics (Windsor: Windsor Works
Publications, 1994).
Girard, Daniel, "New Democrat Kormos Misses Rae
Appearance," Toronto Star, Thursday, June l, 1995.
Goldman:, Ralph M., Contemporary Perspectives On Politics 
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1972).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 7
Harling, Brian, "Why Separate Federal and Provincial
Memberships Won't Work," submitted to the NDP renewal 
conference, December 3-4, 1994.
Harper, Tim, "Jobless, Sick, Aged Under Direct Attack 
McLaughlin Says," Toronto Star, Friday, October 8,
1993.
Harper, Tim, "McLaughlin, Rae meet at last: But Tensions
Are Evident as Leaders Keep Distance," Toronto Star, 
Saturday, September 11, 1993.
Henton, Darcy, "Saskatchewan Voters Poised to give NDP
Second Term," Toronto Star, Wednesday, June 21, 1995.
Henton, Darcy, "Saskatchewan's NDP Wins Second Majority," 
Toronto Star, Thursday, June 22, 1995.
Heron, Craig, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Publishers, 1989).
Hewitt, Alvin, "Organization At the Federal Level,"
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, December 3-4,
1994.
Horowitz, Gad, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1968).
Jupp, James, Australian Party Politics (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1968).
Knowles, Stanley, The New Party (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1961).
Kostyra, Eugene, The NDP Renewal Process, submitted to the 
NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Langdon, Steven, "NDP Needs more than a Renewal Conference," 
Toronto Star, Wednesday, August 24, 1994.
Langdon, Steven and Victoria Cross (eds.), As We Come
Marching: People, Power and Politics (Windsor: Windsor
Works Publications, 1994. " •
Laxer, James, The Choice We Face: Excerpts of Remarks to
the NDP Renewal Conference, submitted to the NDP renewal 
conference, August, 1994.
Laxer, Robert, Canada's Unions (Toronto: Lorimer, 1976).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 8
Lee, Steve, "Who Are We? What Are We?," submitted to the 
NDP renewal conference, December 3-4, 1994.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man: The Social Basis of
Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1960).
Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan (eds-), Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New
York: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1969).
Lorje, Pat, New Directions in Policy for the Federal NDP, 
remarks to the Saskatoon Clark's Crossing NDP, June 29, 
1994.
Mackenzie, David, Rethinking our Mission in Ontario: A
Discussion Paper for Union Leaders, November 1, 1993, 
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Mackenzie, David, Social Coalitions versus Social Democracy 
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Mancuso, Maureen, Richard G. Price, and Ronald Wagenberg 
(eds.), Leaders and Leadership in Canada (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1994).
McKenzie, Robert, Toronto Star, March 26, 1995.
McLaughlin, Audrey, A Nomen's Place: My Life in Politics
(Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1992).
McCarthy, Shawn, "Convention to Take Hard Look," Toronto 
Star, August 26, 1994.
McKeague, Paul, "Labor’s Valhalla Crashes Down,” Windsor 
Star, Wednesday, June 14, 1995.
Mcleod, Ian, Under Siege: The Federal NDP in the Nineties
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1994).
Mendes, Shawn, "Why the NDP is in Trouble," Globe & Mail, 
Friday, October 22, 1993.
Morley, Terry, "Federalism and the New Democratic Party," 
in Campbell Sharman (ed.), Parties and Federalism in 
Australia and Canada (Canberra: Federalism Research
Centre, Australian National University, 1994).
Morton, Desmond, The New Democrats 1961-1986: The Politics
of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 9
Nemeth, Marcy, “The Middle way," Macleans, June 12, 1995.
New Democratic Party, "Panel on Party Mission,"
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, December, 1994.
Northrup, David A. and Anne E. Oram, The 1993 Canadian 
Election Study, Institute for Social Research, York 
University, October 1994.
Ontario Federation of Labour, Labour's Relationship with the 
New Democratic party when the NDP is in Government, 
presented at the OFL’s 2nd Biennial Convention, November 
22-26, 1993.
Panebianco, Angelo, Political Parties: Organization and
Power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1938).
Pammett, Jon H., "Tracking the Votes," in Alan Frizzel, Jon 
H. Pammett and Anthony Westell (EDS.), The Canadian 
General Election of 1993 (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1994).
Papp, Leslie, "Anti-Rae Backlash Taking its Toll," Windsor 
Star, Friday, September 17, 1993.
Papp, Leslie, "Rae offers to Campaign for McLaughlin," 
Toronto Star, Thursday, September 9, 1993.
Parker, Shafer Jr., "The Coercive Return of Union Power," 
Western Report, April 24, 1995.
Parkin, Andrew, and Vern Marshall, "Federalism and the 
Australian Labor Party," in Campbell Sharman (ed.), 
Parties and Federalism in Australia and Canada 
(Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, Australian 
National University, 1994).
Pawley, Howard, A Party Unlike the Others, submitted to the 
NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Pawley, Howard, "Charting the Course For New Jerusalem," in 
Steven Langdon and Victoria cross (EDS.), As We Come 
Marching: Power and Progressive Politics (Windsor:
Windsor Works Publications, 1994).
Pelling, Henry, A Short History of the Labour Party (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1985).
Penner, Norman, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis
(Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1977).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170
Proctor, Dick, "Party Finances - Time For A Change,"
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, December 3-4, 
1994.
Rebick, Judy, Your Mission Should You Accept it...,
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Richards, John, "I Come To Praise Social Democracy, Not To 
Bury It," submitted to the NDP renewal conference, 
December, 1994.
Sallot, Jeff, "McLaughlin Chides Grits: NAFTA Policy
Challenged," Globe & Mail, Saturday, September 18,
1993.
Sharp, Allan, Structural Problems and Criteria for Change, 
submitted to the NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Sharman, Campbell (ed.), Parties and Federalism in Australia 
and Canada (Canberra: Federalism Research Centre,
Australia National University, 1994).
Shire, Donna, "The Merits of the Council of Federal 
Ridings," submitted to the NDP renewal conference, 
December 3-4, 1994.
Soderlund, Walter C., "Advertising in the 1993 Canadian 
Federal Election: Promise and Performance," paper
prepared for presentation at the conference, "Los 
Procesos Electorales en Mexico-Estados Unidos-Canada,
1994."
Stanford, Jim, "Rebuilding A Left Economic Alternative:
Policy Alternatives for the New World Order," submitted 
to the NDP renewal conference, December, 1994.
Steed, Judy, Ed Broadbent: The Pursuit of Power (Markham:
Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1988).
Unknown Author, Windsor Star, Thursday, September 9, 1993.
Vanagas, Steve, Vanagas, "Big Brother Versus Small 
Business," Western Report, June 19, 1995.
Vanagas, Steve, "Pushy Friends From Burnaby," Western
Report, April 24, 1995.
Van Alphen, Tony, "Auto Union Divided over Deserting NDP," 
Toronto Star, August 24, 1994.
Van Alphen, Tony, "OFL Faces Showdown at Top," Toronto
Star, Saturday, May 20, 1995, A19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7 1
Van Alphen, Tony, “Protest Cuts, Unions Tell Voters,"
Toronto Star, Thursday, May 25, 1995.
Van Alphen, Tony, "Labor Message Has Taken on New 
Urgency," Toronto Star, Thursday, June l, 1995.
Walker, William, "McLaughlin Misfires at Famed Health 
Centre," Toronto Star, Wednesday, October 13, 1993.
Walker, William, "Why Ontario Just Keeps Going Deeper into 
Debt," Toronto Star, Thursday, April 20, 1995.
Walker, William, "Deficit Still Big Concern Survey Finds," 
Toronto Star, Friday, April 21, 1995.
Walker, William, "A Look At the 95’ Campaign," Toronto 
Star, Wednesday, June 7, 1995.
Walkom, Thomas, "Union-Backed labour Independents
challenge NDP," Toronto Star, Thursday, May 18, 1995.
White, Walter L-, Ronald H. Wagenberg and Ralph Nelson,
Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government, sixth 
edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994).
Whitehom, Alan, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Whitehom, Alan, "The NDP's Quest For Survival," in Alan
Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell (EDS.), The 
Canadian General Election of 1993 (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1994).
Whitehom, Alan, Some Preliminary Reflections on the Labour 
Movement and the New Democratic Party, paper presented 
to the Canadian Labour Congress, November 4, 1993.
Whitehom, Alan, and Keith Archer, "Party Activists and 
Political Leadership: A Case Study of the NDP," in
Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price, and Ronald Wagenberg 
(EDS.) Leaders and Leadership in Canada (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1994).
Whitehom, Alan, and Keith Archer, Canadian Trade Unions and 
the New Democratic Party (Kingston: Hewson and White
Printing Ltd., 1993).
Wood, Chris, "Stormy Weather," Macleans, April 3, 1995.
Wright, Lisa, "Labor's Love Not Totally Lost NDP Insists," 
Toronto Star, Saturday, April 15, 1995.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7 2
York, Geoffrey, “Langdon Back in Leaders' Favour: Windsor
Riding Gives NDP Hope,” Globe & Mail, Friday, October 1, 
1993.
Young, John, The NDP: Rebuilding What for Whom? submitted
to the NDP renewal conference, August, 1994.
Young, Walter D., The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF
1932-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
Zakuta, Leo, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change
in the CCF (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1964).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
INTERVIEWS
Victoria Cross, March 5, 1995 
Chris Axworthy, April 4, 1995. 
Nelson Riis, April 4, 1995- 
Bill Blaikie, April 4, 1995. 
Howard Pawley, August 11, 1995.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA AUCTORIS
NAME:
PLACE OF BIRTH: 
YEAR OF BIRTH:
EDUCATION:
Victor J. Paolone 
Toronto, Ontario 
1970
Michael Power / St. Joseph’s High School, 
Etobicoke, Ontario, 1984-1989
York University, North York, Ontario, 
1989-1994, Bachelor of Arts (Honours)
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario 
1994-1995, Master of Arts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
